The highest court in Europe has ruled time and again that Western Sahara is «separate and distinct» from Morocco and that EU-Morocco trade and fisheries deals cannot be applied in the territory without Saharawi consent. The latest landmark rulings came on 4 October 2024. 

So what is the value of the goods that the EU, in cahoots with the occupying power Morocco, has plundered from the territory? A shocking report published by the EU Commission in March 2024 sheds some light on this pressing issue. 

The report is a surprising read not only in terms of the enormous amount of wealth that is being taken from the Saharawi people under clearly illegal trade agreements, but also in the sense of the complete lack of sensitivity from the EU Commission in terms of respecting earlier rulings. 

The specific aim of the report, also dubbed a Staff Working Document, is captured in the title: “2023 Report on the impact and benefits for the population of Western Sahara of the extension of tariff preferences to products originating in Western Sahara”. 

The report - which can be accessed here - is a remarkable attempt to justify extending the EU-Morocco trade deal into Western Sahara against the will of the people of the territory and in violation of pertinent EU case law. Under the recently judged as illegal EU-Morocco trade deal, agricultural and fisheries products from occupied Western Sahara were imported into the EU. These fisheries products include canned fish, frozen fish, fresh fish, etc. It is important to note that these imports of fisheries products occurred as part of the EU-Morocco trade deal, and not of the fisheries agreement, which arranged for access for EU fishing vessels to the waters of Morocco and occupied Western Sahara.

So how much was illegally plundered? 

The report concludes that the trade agreement has a direct effect on the agricultural and on the fisheries sector. For 2022, the combined export value to Europe in these two sectors is an astonishing €590 million – €504 million in fisheries products and €85.6 million in agriculture products. In total, this constitutes 203,000 tonnes of goods (129,200 tonnes of which was fish products and 74,000 tonnes of tomatoes and melons).

These products were not exported directly from Western Sahara to the Union: they had undergone packaging and transport via Morocco proper, before being shipped to the EU. In detail: 

• 87,000 tonnes of tomatoes (mainly the cherry tomato) and melons were produced in the southern part of occupied Western Sahara. 85% thereof, or 74,000 tonnes, was exported to the EU. The value of the produce is said to have been €85.6 million: €76.9 million for tomatoes and €8.7 million for melons.
• 43 tonnes of peppers have been exported in 2022, but does not specify whether they went to the EU or elsewhere.
• Export has gone up by 25% compared to 2019. From when the agreement entered into force, in 2016, to 2022, production in the area has increased by 73.5%.
• The report states that 129,200 tonnes of fish products originating in Western Sahara were transported to the Union in 2022. The Moroccan government stated it could not give an exact percentage of how much of the “local” production was exported to the Union, but puts it at around 60%.

Another effect deemed positive by the report, is that “the implementation of the agreement therefore saved EUR 44.4 million on imports into the EU of products originating in Western Sahara for the year 2022.” Under the agreement, agricultural and fishery products from occupied Western Sahara enter the Union free from tariff. If tariff had been applicable, the Union would have yielded €9.7 million in custom duties for agricultural products, and €34.7 million for fishery products, during 2022. 

The Commission claims that the agreement is directly responsible for 49,000 jobs in Western Sahara. The calculation used for that figure is remarkably simplistic: because 85% of the agricultural products of the area is exported to Europe, 85% of the jobs in the sector are considered a direct result of the agreement. The same logic is applied to the fishing sector. In spite of a quick reference to “some civil society organisations” referring to "unequal access to natural resources, jobs and other supplies and services", and to the “almost total exemption from all forms of direct or indirect taxation for people and businesses established in the territory”, no pause is taken to consider who is being employed in the territory: Saharawis or Moroccan settlers?

What else is wrong with this document? WSRW has reviewed the text. Below are our six main findings. 

1. 1. No mention of the people of Western Sahara

The report includes several pages that summarise “the effects of the agreement on the population of Western Sahara”. It should be noted that there is a difference between the notion of the “population of Western Sahara” and “the people of Western Sahara”. This has been highlighted by the EU Courts, several times, and nowhere as clear as in the 4 October ruling. 

The population of the non-self-governing territory are the inhabitants currently present in the territory, irrespective of whether they belong to the people of the territory – those who hold the internationally recognised right to self-determination. The population of Western Sahara today consists of a majority of Moroccan settlers – drawn into the territory over job opportunities and tax exemptions (as the EU Commission’s report explains). The people of Western Sahara, on the other hand, are nowadays a minority in their homeland, with many living in refugee camps in Algeria or having sought their refuge elsewhere. The EU Commission has always related to the population, rather than to the people of Western Sahara in its approach to the territory, and this report is no different.

1. 2. Morocco is considered as the interlocutor for Western Sahara

The report is based on data provided by the Moroccan government through a statistical database controlled by that government. In addition, information about the implementation of the agreement in Western Sahara has been obtained through the EU's annual exchanges of information with the government of Morocco. 

This is emblematic of the EU’s approach to Western Sahara: it is carried out solely with Morocco, which according to the UN, the International Court of Justice and the EU’s own Courts, has no sovereignty or administering mandate over the territory. 

The UN-recognised representation of the people of Western Sahara, the Polisario Front, isn’t in any way included in the above mentioned formalised communication channels for discussing trade with Western Sahara. At best, they are invited as part of a stakeholder consultation, as has been the case in this report. Polisario is featured among the “wide range of entities and civil society organisations” that the Commission has reached out to in view of drafting this particular report. 

Western Sahara Resource Watch is also listed here as a “stakeholder”, with a footnote referencing our refusal to take part in what we perceive as an attempt to legitimize the unlawful implementation of an agreement with Morocco in Western Sahara. Read our response to the Commission's invitation of December 2023 here. 

Polisario refused to take part for the same reason, as has Saharawi human rights group CODESA.Of the listed 17 “entities”, only three appear to have shared information with the Commission.

The report also states that the EU Commission carried out a technical visit to El Aaiún and Dakhla, “organised by the Moroccan authorities, at the request of the European Commission”, from 12 to 14 December 2023. “During the visits to Laâyoune and Dakhla, the European Commission talked with various local stakeholders, including representatives of the Moroccan government in the region, representatives of the regional council and the regional investment centre, engineers, farmers and cooperative leaders”, the report reads. The visit to Morocco’s capital Rabat was filled with meetings with Moroccan government representatives.

3. In practice, there is no differentiation between Morocco and Western Sahara 

When the European Parliament approved a version of the EU-Morocco trade deal that had been amended to specifically refer to Western Sahara as part of its operational scope - despite the lack of consent thereto by the people of the territory - the Parliament had a request for the Commission: that it would ensure that a mechanism would be put in place so the customs authorities of the Union would have access to reliable information on products originating in Western Sahara that were imported into the EU. In addition, the Parliament wanted an annual assessment of the mechanism's conformity with EU customs legislation.

In practice, there is no distinction being made between the territories of Morocco and Western Sahara. Customs authorities need to rely on lists of authorized exporters provided by DG SANCO. The establishments in Western Sahara that are exporting to the EU, are on the Moroccan lists - there are no separate lists for Western Sahara. In the lists, there is no indication which area is located in Morocco or in Western Sahara - no differentiation is made.

In addition, the EU Commission relies completely on an online platform set up by the Moroccan authorities in 2020. The EU Commission and the EU Member States' customs authorities can consult this platform for all food products covered by the EU-Morocco deal. WSRW has not seen this database, and is unable to assess whether this Moroccan database actually indicates the origins of the products.

There are control procedures in place, based on the presentation of a proof of origin and on the administrative cooperation between the customs authorities of the importing EU country and the customs authorities of Morocco.

The agreement is thus carried out in violation of the EU Court's finding - in now 10 rulings since 2015 - that Western Sahara is separate and distinct from Morocco, and ought to be treated as such. 

4. The environmental effects of the economic activities are hardly assessed

“The European Commission has not been able to determine the volume of water in the aquifers that can be used for irrigation purposes” the report says. The report recognises that the current production of niche products in the territory (tomatoes, melons, red fruit) consumes a lot of water that is being drawn directly from groundwater reserves. It however relies on the “competent Moroccan authorities” to monitor the issue.

The report remarks that two desalination projects are currently being built in the territory “in the context of a national plan to provide the territory of Western Sahara with drinking water”, continuing that once built, 75% of the desalinated water will be used to create 13,000 additional hectares of farmland.

“Soils may be affected by run-off resulting from potentially unsustainable use of fertilisers and pesticides associated with intensive agricultural production”, it reads, adding that “the European Commission has not obtained information allowing the situation in this respect in Western Sahara to be assessed.”

5. Violations of the Geneva Convention are normalised

“The granting of the tariff preferences provided for in the Agreement is also an indirect incentive to invest in desalination stations in order to increase irrigation capacity and consequently cultivable farmland, with a view to exports to the Union”, the report reads.

Morocco has no sovereignty over Western Sahara, and is not the administering power of the territory. It invaded and annexed large parts of the territory in defiance of the UN and the International Court of Justice, and maintains its presence there through deployment of military force. It will not allow the UN to organise a referendum on self-determination. Morocco can thus only be considered as an occupying power in Western Sahara. Under the fourth Geneva Convention, the transfer of an occupying power’s civilians into the occupied territory, as well as any measures that promote such settlement, are prohibited. Morocco’s violation of the Geneva Conventions through its settlement policy in Western Sahara was described in a report by the Bundestag in 2020. It is remarkable that precisely this strategy, employed by Morocco in Western Sahara, is lauded by the EU Commission.

The report reads that Morocco is in the process of transforming an additional 13,000 hectares of land into farmland, on top of the roughly 1,000 hectares that are currently in use. “The aim of the projects is to increase the current agricultural land area and the corresponding volume of agricultural production by one thousand percent by 2030, with an increase in the number of direct jobs in the sector in the order of 50 000 to 100 000. According to the information received, this would also provide employment and local settlement opportunities for sub-Saharan migrants transiting through the territory”, the EU Commission writes, adding that the logistics chain would also evolve “with the creation of the Dakhla Atlantic Port and the industrial and commercial area of the Port of Laâyoune.”

The burgeoning aquaculture industry, which WSRW documented earlier this year, is described as “subject of invitations to tender to which European companies respond”.

The Moroccan settlement policy is also described. “These territories are economically attractive to both local and foreign investors due to their close to zero taxation. During the visit of the Commission delegation, many of those spoken to, have confirmed the tax breaks granted to households and companies throughout the territory concerned: no VAT, no income tax, no housing tax, land tax or corporation tax for businesses in Western Sahara. This advantageous tax situation incentivises the establishment of new businesses. According to the CIDH, these tax exemptions have existed since 1975.”

Rather than calling a spade a spade – or an occupation an occupation - the EU Commission coins Morocco’s settlement policy as “measures [that] are part of Morocco’s policy of sustainable development in Western Sahara”. 

“For operators not belonging to these sectors of activity, in the absence of other categories of products exported to the Union, the Agreement seems to have more of an indirect bearing on their choice to invest in Western Sahara. Significant infrastructure projects are under construction in the field of seawater desalination and renewable energy. These local investments should contribute to the economic development of the territories and increase their attractiveness for local and international investors, while enabling the development of new industrial activities that could potentially benefit from the agreement”, the report concludes.

Similar statements about Ukraine are unthinkable.

6. EU closes eyes to human rights situation

Year after year, Western Sahara ends up in the tail-end of rankings of countries and territories in terms of political rights and civil liberties. The territory is considered a human rights black spot by reputable human rights organisations. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights lamented in 2023 that it had been 8 years since Morocco last allowed his office access to the territory. 

Despite that context, the EU Commission concludes that extending the EU-Morocco trade deal to Western Sahara has contributed to the human rights situation. In particular, the Commission writes, the deal has “contributed to the normalisation and relaunch of EU-Morocco relations and, as such, to maintaining their dialogue and constructive cooperation on the protection of human rights, which could otherwise have been affected or compromised.”

The Commission says it mainly follows the human rights situation in Western Sahara via Morocco. “Western Sahara is considered by Morocco as an integral part of its territory, including as regards the country’s human rights policy. As a consequence, and without prejudice to the EU’s own position on Western Sahara, the human rights situation in Western Sahara has traditionally been monitored by the EU pursuant to the institutional framework governing bilateral EU-Morocco relations.” Under the Association Agreement, the two partners have set up a subcommittee on human rights, democratisation and governance, where the situation in Western Sahara is supposedly discussed.

No consideration is seemingly being made that Morocco may not be a legitimate or honest interlocutor on the issue of human rights in the territory it holds under military occupation.

Finally, adding insult to injury, the EU Commission expresses its concern for the “continuing suffering of Saharawi refugees, their dependence on external humanitarian aid”, while stressing its commitment to providing humanitarian assistance and encouraging donors to provide additional funds. 

For reference, in 2023, the EU had earmarked €9 million to the Saharawi refugees. In that same year, it had paid Morocco - which has bombed Saharawis out of their land and into refugeehood - €42.4 million as part of the EU-Morocco Fisheries Agreement. No less than 99% of the catches made under that agreement were made in Western Sahara. The contrast with the value of the application of the EU-Morocco trade deal in Western Sahara - €590 million in 2022 - is even more grotesque.

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