Die Rechtsberatungsfirma Global Diligence, die sich als Experte für „verstärkte Sorgfaltspflicht“ präsentiert, stellt die völkerrechtliche Situation in der besetzten Westsahara falsch dar.
Im April dieses Jahres hielt die Rechtsberatungsfirma Global Diligence einen umstrittenen Vortrag, der einen aufschlussreichen Einblick darin gibt, wie Unternehmen ihre Arbeit für ausländische Wirtschaftsinteressen in der besetzten Westsahara rechtfertigen.
Die digitale Veranstaltung wurde von der Beratungsfirma Beyond Human Rights Compliance ausgerichtet. Beide Organisationen haben ihren Sitz in London und sind darauf spezialisiert, andere Unternehmen in Fragen der verstärkten Sorgfaltspflicht im Bereich Menschenrechte, Sanktionen und humanitäres Völkerrecht zu beraten.
Die Sitzung ist auf YouTube verfügbar.
Unter dem Titel „Verantwortungsbewusstes Unternehmertum in besetzten Gebieten: die erforderliche rechtliche Analyse” traten zwei Referenten auf, darunter Richard Rogers, Gründungspartner von Global Diligence. Der Moderator stellte den Vortrag von Global Diligence als eine Auseinandersetzung mit den „Komplexitäten rund um den ungelösten Status der Region und dem Ansatz, den Unternehmen verfolgen sollten, um Menschenrechtsnormen einzuhalten” vor – eine Formulierung, die bereits die folgenden kontroversen Argumente vorwegnahm.
Bemerkenswert ist, dass in der Einleitung die Westsahara als „Region“ bezeichnet wurde – ein Begriff, der üblicherweise von der marokkanischen Regierung verwendet wird, die Teile des Gebiets illegal besetzt hält. Die UNO und internationale Gerichte definieren die Westsahara als Hoheitsgebiet mit international anerkannten Grenzen.
Im Vortrag legt Global Diligence den rechtlichen Rahmen dar, auf den sich Unternehmen in der Regel stützen, wenn sie sich dafür entscheiden, unter marokkanischer Lizenz in dem besetzten Gebiet tätig zu werden. Seit 2021 ist Western Sahara Resource Watch (WSRW) die Arbeit von Global Diligence für ausländische Akteure in der besetzten Westsahara bekannt, aber diese Präsentation bietet seltene Einblicke aus erster Hand, wie das Unternehmen solche Aktivitäten rechtfertigt.
In früheren Korrespondenzen hat das Unternehmen keine Details darüber genannt, wie es Aspekte des Völkerrechts in der Westsahara auslegt.
Während des Seminars erklärte Global Diligence, dass es an „drei Projekten” in der Westsahara gearbeitet habe, die die Bereiche erneuerbare Energien, Entsalzung und Landwirtschaft umfassten, und dass es mehrere „Unternehmen” beraten habe. Bislang war nur ein Auftrag öffentlich bekannt, nämlich die Arbeit für das französische Unternehmen Engie im Jahr 2021. Wenn das Engie-Projekt in naher Zukunft umgesetzt wird, könnte es zu einem erheblichen Zustrom marokkanischer Siedler:innen in das besetzte Gebiet führen.
Der zweite Redner, Wayne Jordash, geschäftsführender Gesellschafter von Beyond Human Rights Compliance, bot eine differenziertere Darstellung der rechtlichen und ethischen Rahmenbedingungen für die Tätigkeit in besetzten Gebieten. Rogers und Jordash haben bereits in anderen Zusammenhängen professionell zusammengearbeitet.
Am Ende des Artikels finden Sie eine vollständige, kommentierte Abschrift der 15-minütigen Präsentation von Global Diligence auf English. Im Folgenden haben wir die wichtigsten Fehler und Falschdarstellungen im Ansatz von Global Diligence zusammengefasst.
1. Nichtberücksichtigung der Urteile des EuGH
Bemerkenswerterweise nimmt Global Diligence keinen einzigen Bezug auf die zehn Urteile des Gerichtshofs der Europäischen Union (2015-2024), die durchweg den völkerrechtlichen Status der Westsahara, die Rechte des sahrauischen Volkes und die Rechtsstellung der Frente Polisario als Vertreterin des sahrauischen Volkes bestätigen. Das Fehlen jeglicher Bezugnahme auf die Rechtsprechung des EuGH ist außergewöhnlich – insbesondere für ein Unternehmen, das in der EU ansässige Unternehmen berät. Der Gerichtshof hat festgestellt, dass das Abkommen zwischen der EU und Marokko aus dem Jahr 2018, auf dessen Grundlage landwirtschaftliche Erzeugnisse aus der Westsahara nach Europa exportiert werden, unter Verstoß gegen das Völkerrecht geschlossen wurde – insbesondere gegen das Selbstbestimmungsrecht und das Recht auf Zustimmung des sahrauischen Volkes. Genau diesen Agrarhandel fördert das französische Unternehmen Engie durch Projekte, für die Global Diligence beratend tätig war. Die zentrale Argumentation von Global Diligence, dass Ausbeutung nach internationalem Recht zulässig ist, wenn sie der lokalen Bevölkerung zugutekommt, steht im Widerspruch zu den Urteilen des EuGH, die die Zustimmung als einziges Kriterium (explizit oder „vermutet“) anführen. Bemerkenswert ist, dass die Europäische Kommission und der Rat zuvor dieselbe fehlerhafte Argumentation wie Global Diligence verwendet haben. Das Fehlen einer Reflexion über die Entscheidungen des höchsten europäischen Gerichts in einem Vortrag, der sich mit den rechtlichen Aspekten der Unternehmensaktivitäten in der Westsahara befasst, ist verwirrend. In einem früheren Schriftwechsel mit WSRW argumentierte Global Diligence, dass „die in Ihrer Antwort genannten Entscheidungen des EuGH gemäß den etablierten Grundsätzen des Völkerrechts für zwischenstaatliche Beziehungen gelten, die für private Einrichtungen nicht unmittelbar bindend sind“. Das Recht auf Selbstbestimmung ist jedoch ein grundlegendes Menschenrecht, das über die zwischenstaatlichen Beziehungen hinausgeht, und der Grundsatz der relativen Wirkung von Verträgen ist ein grundlegendes Prinzip des Vertragsrechts, das in jedem Rechtssystem existiert – einschließlich des marokkanischen Rechts (siehe Artikel 228).
2. Nichtberücksichtigung des Urteils des Afrikanischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte von 2022 zur Westsahara
Am 22. September 2022 fällte der Afrikanische Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte und Rechte der Völker ein wegweisendes Urteil zur Westsahara, in dem es heißt:
Angesichts der Tatsache, dass der Afrikanische Gerichtshof der Menschenrechtsgerichtshof der Afrikanischen Union mit spezifischer Zuständigkeit für das Selbstbestimmungsrecht ist, ist es verwunderlich, dass Global Diligence keinen Hinweis auf das Urteil des Gerichtshofs aus dem Jahr 2022 nimmt.
Würde Global Diligence Unternehmen beraten, die bereit sind, auf der besetzten Krim zu investieren, würde es dann das Urteil des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte vom 25. Juni 2024 nicht erwähnen und behaupten, dass es sich dabei nur um zwischenstaatliche Verfahren handelt?
3. Fehlinterpretation des Rechtsgutachtens der Vereinten Nationen von 2002
Die gesamte Argumentation der Kanzlei scheint auf einer Fehlinterpretation des Rechtsgutachtens des UN-Rechtsberaters Hans Corell aus dem Jahr 2002 zu beruhen. Diese Fehlinterpretation ist mit derjenigen identisch, die einst von der Europäischen Kommission vorgebracht und später vom EuGH zurückgewiesen wurde. Anstatt die Schlussfolgerung des Gutachtens wiederzugeben, in der die Voraussetzung der vorherigen Zustimmung des sahrauischen Volkes betont wird, zitiert Global Diligence frühere Absätze aus dem Zusammenhang gerissen.
Im Jahr 2021 erinnerte WSRW Global Diligence daran, dass „die Schlussfolgerung des Corell-Gutachtens im 25. – abschließenden – Absatz zu finden ist”, und warnte davor, analytische Passagen als Schlussfolgerung darzustellen. https://vest-sahara.s3.amazonaws.com/wsrw/feature-images/File/107/6040e4d329b7d_20210203WSRW-GlobalDiligence.pdf. Global Diligence antwortete, dass es an seiner „Auslegung der gesamten Stellungnahme von Hans Corell“ festhalte.
Die Stellungnahme aus dem Jahr 2002 hat weit weniger Gewicht als die zehn Urteile des EuGH. Tatsächlich hat der EuGH in seinem Urteil in den verbundenen Rechtssachen C-789/19 und C-799/19 (Rn. 137-138) ausdrücklich die Möglichkeit ausgeschlossen, dass sich die Europäische Kommission jemals wieder auf die Rechtsstellungnahme der Vereinten Nationen aus dem Jahr 2002 stützen könnte, indem er die Argumentation des Gerichts der Europäischen Union bestätigte, dass „das Schreiben des Rechtsberaters der Vereinten Nationen vom 29. Januar 2002 [...] keine Quelle des EU-Rechts darstellt, auf die sich vor den EU-Gerichten berufen werden kann, da es als solches weder einer für die Europäische Union verbindlichen Regel des Völkervertragsrechts noch einer Regel des Völkergewohnheitsrechts entspricht.“ Global Diligence ignoriert diese Hierarchie.
Im Vortrag wird auch nicht anerkannt, dass der EuGH den früheren Missbrauch des Corell-Gutachtens durch die EU ausdrücklich diskreditiert hat. Der Verfasser selbst, Hans Corell, bezeichnete solche Verzerrungen als „absurd” und reagierte empört, als private Unternehmen sein Gutachten zur Rechtfertigung ihrer Aktivitäten heranzogen. „Bereits die Unterzeichnung eines Abkommens, in dem Marokko die Westsahara als ‚die südlichen Provinzen des Königreichs Marokko‘ bezeichnet, steht im Widerspruch zur sozialen Verantwortung von Unternehmen und den Grundsätzen ‚Schützen, Respektieren und Abhilfe schaffen‘“, erklärte Corell. Eine solche Praxis spiegelt genau das wider, was die Partner von Global Diligence tun.
Nach den Urteilen des EuGH im Jahr 2021 hätte der Missbrauch der Corell-Stellungnahme als geklärt gelten müssen. Weitere Informationen finden Sie in den Ausführungen unten und in den Urteilen des EuGH zu Handel und Fischerei aus dem Jahr 2021.
4. Anwendung allgemeiner Grundsätze des Völkerrechts im falschen Kontext
Global Diligence wendet allgemeine Grundsätze des Völkerrechts in Bezug auf Hoheitsgebiete ohne Selbstregierung unkritisch an, als wäre die Westsahara ein Standardfall der Entkolonialisierung. Das ist sie jedoch nicht. Nach dem einseitigen Rückzug Spaniens 1975-76 fehlte der Westsahara eine Verwaltungsmacht, eine Tatsache, die in dem von der Kanzlei zitierten Rechtsgutachten der Vereinten Nationen klar dargelegt wird. Spanien bleibt zwar de jure die Verwaltungsmacht, ist aber nicht im Gebiet präsent und handelt daher nicht im Namen des sahrauischen Volkes, um die Entkolonialisierung voranzutreiben.
5. Falsche Bezeichnung Marokkos als Verwaltungsmacht
Global Diligence bezeichnet „Marokko als Administrativmacht“ (“administrative power”). Diese Formulierung enthält zwei grundlegende Fehler: a) In der Charta der Vereinten Nationen wird der Begriff „Verwaltungsmacht“ verwendet, nicht „Administrativmacht“. Die Kanzlei verwechselt den faktischen Begriff der Verwaltungskontrolle mit dem rechtlichen Begriff der „Verwaltungsmacht“. Letzteres beinhaltet spezifische Verpflichtungen gemäß der UN-Charta, während ersteres keine definierte rechtliche Bedeutung hat. Wie EU-Generalanwalt Wathelet in seiner Stellungnahme von 2018 in C-266/16 (Abs. 223) feststellte: „Der Begriff der ‚de facto Verwaltungsmacht‘ existiert im Völkerrecht nicht“. b) Marokko hat kein völkerrechtliches Mandat über die Westsahara und ist daher keine Verwaltungsmacht. Dies wird in der Corell-Stellungnahme (§ 6-7) ausdrücklich bestätigt, was Global Diligence jedoch auslässt. Die maßgeblichste Stellungnahme zum Fehlen einer Verwaltungsmacht findet sich in § 388 des Handelsurteils des EuGH von 2021, in dem erklärt wird, dass die Corell-Stellungnahme in Analogie zu Verwaltungsmächten abgegeben wurde – eine Rolle, die Marokko nicht innehat. Marokko selbst räumt ein, dass es weder die Verwaltungsmacht noch die Besatzungsmacht ist und nicht wie eine Verwaltungsmacht verpflichtet ist, der UN-Generalversammlung Bericht zu erstatten. Der Verfasser der Corell-Stellungnahme macht deutlich, dass seine Stellungnahme analog abgegeben wurde.
6. Nichtberücksichtigung von Besatzungskriterien und -verpflichtungen
Global Diligence beginnt seine Präsentation mit dem Vorschlag, dass Unternehmen die Westsahara als „besetzt” behandeln sollten, zieht dann jedoch Schlussfolgerungen, die eher auf Politik als auf Recht basieren: „Für Unternehmen, die dort tätig werden wollen, ist es am sichersten, die Westsahara als besetztes Gebiet zu betrachten, in dem die Selbstbestimmung letztendlich intern mit Marokko geregelt wird”. Die Präsentation versäumt es, die Verpflichtungen oder Beschränkungen einer Besatzungsmacht nach dem humanitären Völkerrecht (IHL) zu untersuchen. Stattdessen greift sie auf die falsch angewandte Analogie-Stellungnahme der UNO zu Hoheitsgebieten ohne Selbstregierung zurück und ignoriert dabei das Fehlen einer Kolonialmacht. Folglich bewertet sie weder, wie Unternehmen in einem besetzten Gebiet handeln sollten, noch befasst sie sich mit den Bedingungen für rechtmäßiges unternehmerisches Handeln in einem Hoheitsgebiet ohne Selbstregierung ohne Verwaltungsmacht.
7. Einführung der „internen“ Selbstbestimmung
Die Westsahara stellt eine Entkolonialisierungsfrage im Sinne der Resolution 1514 (XV) der Generalversammlung der Vereinten Nationen vom 14. Dezember 1960 mit dem Titel „Erklärung über die Gewährung der Unabhängigkeit an koloniale Länder und Völker” dar. Diese Resolution, die oft als Magna Carta der kolonialen Völker bezeichnet wird, verankert das Recht auf Selbstbestimmung und Unabhängigkeit. Dementsprechend hat das sahrauische Volk das Recht auf externe Selbstbestimmung, einschließlich der Gründung eines unabhängigen Staates, frei von ausländischer Herrschaft und militärischer Besatzung. Im Gegensatz dazu findet der Begriff der „internen“ Selbstbestimmung weder in der Rechtsauffassung der Vereinten Nationen noch in irgendwelchen internationalen Gerichtsurteilen zur Westsahara eine Grundlage. Internationale Gerichte haben bestätigt, dass die Westsahara und Marokko „gesonderte und unterschiedliche“ Gebiete sind, die durch eine internationale Grenze getrennt sind.
Global Diligence rät Unternehmen außerdem, einen hypothetischen zukünftigen Status der Westsahara („... letztendlich intern mit Marokko geregelt“) als Teil ihrer derzeitigen sogenannten verstärkten Sorgfaltspflicht zu berücksichtigen.
Dies ist eine höchst ungewöhnliche Erwartung, die man an Unternehmen stellt.
8. Überbetonung der politischen Unterstützung für Marokko
Das Unternehmen hebt Fälle internationaler politischer Unterstützung für Marokko hervor, als ob diese für die Menschenrechtsverpflichtungen eines Unternehmens relevant wären. Politische Bekundungen wie der Tweet von Donald Trump aus dem Jahr 2020 mögen zwar die geopolitische Dynamik veranschaulichen, haben jedoch keinen Einfluss auf die rechtlichen Verpflichtungen von Unternehmen gemäß dem humanitären Völkerrecht oder den Menschenrechtsgesetzen. Im Gegenteil: Wenn eine westliche Regierung eine illegale Situation politisch unterstützt, haben Unternehmen aus demselben Land eine noch größere Verpflichtung, sich an das Völkerrecht und die Rechtsprechung zu halten.
9. Fehleinschätzung der Frente Polisario
Global Diligence stellt die Frente Polisario fälschlicherweise so dar, als strebe sie nur die vollständige Unabhängigkeit an. Das bestehende Friedensabkommen ermöglicht es dem sahrauischen Volk, über seine eigene Zukunft zu entscheiden; die Unabhängigkeit ist eine Option unter vielen. Die Polisario lehnt konsequent jede aufgezwungene Lösung ab, die dieses Recht auf freie Wahl verweigert. Im Gegensatz dazu verweigert Marokkos einziger Vorschlag – die Integration der Westsahara in Marokko – den Sahrauis die Möglichkeit, über alternative Optionen abzustimmen.
10. Herunterspielen der Rolle der Polisario
Die Polisario wird von den Vereinten Nationen als Vertretung des sahrauischen Volkes und als eine der beiden Parteien des von den Vereinten Nationen geführten Friedensprozesses anerkannt. Als nationale Befreiungsbewegung ist sie die einzige Organisation dieser Art, die den Genfer Konventionen beigetreten ist, was den internationalen Charakter des Konflikts zwischen den beiden Parteien unterstreicht. Der EuGH kommt zu dem Schluss, dass die Polisario das sahrauische Volk rechtmäßig vertritt und Zugang zu den Gerichten der EU hat, um dessen Recht auf Selbstbestimmung zu verteidigen. Global Diligence setzt jedoch die Polisario mit „anderen sahrauischen Gruppen [...], die die marokkanische Verwaltung unterstützen“ gleich.
11. Falsche Bezugnahme auf Vorteile für das sahrauische Volk
Die meisten Sahrauis, insbesondere aus den Küstengemeinden aus der Region Dakhla, leben seit der ungerechtfertigten und illegalen Invasion Marokkos in Geflüchtetencamps. Der EuGH hat entschieden, dass bei jeglicher Form der Ausbeutung im Rahmen der Handelsabkommen zwischen der EU und Marokko die Vorteile in erster Linie diesen Flüchtlingslagern zugutekommen müssen. Paradoxerweise lehnt Global Diligence eine Zusammenarbeit mit der Frente Polisario ab und bezeichnet einen solchen Dialog als „nicht hilfreich” für die Bewertung der Vorteile. Diese Haltung erschwert es, die Aktivitäten mit den Urteilen des EuGH in Einklang zu bringen.
12. Irreführende Behauptungen zur Einbeziehung von Interessengruppen
Global Diligence behauptet, dass seine Konsultationen die Polisario und zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen, die sie unterstützen, einbezogen hätten. WSRW forderte Engie auf, die Studie von Global Diligence im Jahr 2023 zu veröffentlichen, erhielt jedoch keine Antwort. Es erscheint unwahrscheinlich, dass die Polisario an einer solchen Konsultation der Interessengruppen teilgenommen hat. Dies entspricht ähnlichen Behauptungen der Europäischen Kommission über inklusive Konsultationen zu EU-marokkanischen Handelsabkommen in der Westsahara, die sich später als falsch erwiesen haben (zur vorgetäuschten Konsultation von Interessengruppen durch die EU siehe WSRW Bericht „Above the Law” (2020)).
WSRW mit seinem umfangreichen sahrauischen Netzwerk hat keine Kenntnis davon, dass eine sahrauische Gruppe an der Engie-Studie 2021 von Global Diligence oder ähnlichen Beratungen teilgenommen hat. Als WSRW das Unternehmen aufforderte, den Begriff „Interessengruppe” zu definieren, seine Aufgabenbeschreibung offenzulegen und zu klären, ob die Ergebnisse dem sahrauischen Volk mitgeteilt würden, reagierte Global Diligence nicht.
13. Legitimität der „Regionalregierung” und marokkanischer Wahlen
Global Diligence behauptet, „gewählte und ernannte Beamte” der sogenannten „Regionalregierung” konsultiert zu haben. Das Unternehmen erklärt jedoch nicht, warum es die von Marokko durchgeführten Wahlen und Ernennungen im besetzten Gebiet als rechtlich gültig oder relevant ansieht.
Anstatt die Frente Polisario als Vertretung des sahrauischen Volkes anzuerkennen (wie sowohl vom EuGH als auch von der UN-Generalversammlung bestätigt), behandelt Global Diligence die von Marokko unterstützten Beamt:innen in Dakhla als solche. Dies ist sehr kontrovers. WSRW hat nicht gesehen, dass Global Diligence argumentiert, dass russische Abgeordnete in Sewastopol oder Abgeordnete, die durch israelische Parlamentswahlen in den besetzten palästinensischen Gebieten gewählt wurden, die Vertretung des Volkes des besetzten Gebiets sind.
14. Pro-marokkanische Darstellung des Konflikts
Der Bericht stellt Marokkos Plan zur Eingliederung der Westsahara – den sogenannten „Autonomieplan“ – als wohlwollende „Bemühung um eine Lösung“ dar, während die Position der Sahrauis lediglich als „zeitweiliger bewaffneter Widerstand“ dargestellt wird, der „trotz dieser Bemühungen“ stattfindet. Diese Darstellung kehrt die Logik des Völkerrechts um. Würde Global Diligence andere unrechtmäßige, ungerechtfertigte Besatzungen in ähnlicher Weise beschreiben, die Aggression herunterspielen und den Widerstand diffamieren? Der Konflikt würde sofort beendet sein, wenn Marokko seine Besatzung beenden und dem sahrauischen Volk gemäß der UN-Charta die freie Ausübung seines Selbstbestimmungsrechts gestatten würde.
15. Die fehlende Zivilgesellschaft als friedlich darstellen
Global Diligence beschreibt die Westsahara als „sehr friedlich“. Dies steht in direktem Widerspruch zum Jahresbericht des UN-Generalsekretärs an den Sicherheitsrat, in dem Menschenrechtsverletzungen dokumentiert sind. Die Bezeichnung des Gebiets als „friedlich“ ist eine Beleidigung für die Sahrauis, die unter Besatzung leben, in einem Gebiet, das von Freedom House als eines der Länder mit den geringsten politischen Rechten und bürgerlichen Freiheiten weltweit eingestuft wird. Der Hochkommissar der Vereinten Nationen für Menschenrechte und der Generalsekretär der Vereinten Nationen haben kürzlich darauf hingewiesen, dass dem OHCHR seit 2015 kein Zugang zur Westsahara gewährt wurde.
Die Behauptung, Dakhla verfüge über echte demokratische Institutionen, in denen die Sahrauis frei ihre Vertreter:innen wählen können, ist, gelinde gesagt, komplett falsch. Der Generalsekretär des Vereins, der die Plünderung natürlicher Ressourcen überwacht, verbüßt derzeit eine lebenslange Haftstrafe in einem marokkanischen Gefängnis.
Der einzige öffentlich bekannte Kunde von Global Diligence in der Westsahara, Engie, stellt seine Aktivitäten stets so dar, als würden sie „in Marokko” stattfinden. Diese Darstellung findet sich durchgängig in den externen Berichten, Social-Media-Beiträgen und bekannten Verträgen mit Dritten von Engie. Das Unternehmen hat sich wiederholt geweigert, Fragen von WSRW zu beantworten, darunter auch zu der unveröffentlichten Studie von Global Diligence.
Es gibt keine Anzeichen dafür, dass Engie jemals mit einem einzigen Sahraui in Kontakt getreten ist. In seiner Umweltstudie wird systematisch behauptet, dass sich der Projektstandort in „Marokko” befindet, und sogar der Bevölkerungszuwachs in der Umgebung des Projektgebiets wird als Zeichen des Erfolgs hervorgehoben. Das Projekt selbst wurde von der marokkanischen Regierung in internationalen Klimaforen ausdrücklich als Beweis für ihre „grünen” Investitionen angepriesen – ein Versuch, die Besatzung der Westsahara durch den Einsatz erneuerbarer Energien zu beschönigen.
„Sie haben uns in der Anfangsphase des Projekts um Unterstützung gebeten, damit sie ihren Menschenrechtsverpflichtungen nachkommen können”, erklärte Global Diligence zu seiner Beteiligung.
WSRW fällt es schwer, das erklärte Bekenntnis von Engie zu den Menschenrechtsverpflichtungen mit seiner Weigerung, den international anerkannten Status – oder sogar die Existenz – des Gebiets anzuerkennen, in dem es tätig ist, in Einklang zu bringen.
Mehrere problematische Elemente der Auslegung des Völkerrechts durch Global Diligence und seiner Interpretation des Rechtsgutachtens der Vereinten Nationen von 2002 wurden von WSRW in einem Brief an das Unternehmen aus dem Jahr 2021 angesprochen. Die meisten Fragen blieben unbeantwortet.
Die bloße Existenz der Studie von Global Diligence wurde von Engie genutzt, um seine Aktivitäten in dem Gebiet zu legitimieren. In diesem Sinne ist die Studie zu einem der problematischsten Dokumente geworden, die derzeit zur Verteidigung der marokkanischen Interessen in der Westsahara herangezogen werden. Was auch immer die unveröffentlichte Empfehlung von Global Diligence an Engie enthalten haben mag, das Ergebnis ist klar: Engie stützt sich auf diese Studie, um Aktivitäten zu rechtfertigen, die die Siedlungspolitik Marokkos vorantreiben – indem sie die Umsiedlung marokkanischer Bürger:innen in das besetzte Gebiet erleichtert und gleichzeitig beharrlich vermeidet anzuerkennen, dass das Projekt in der Westsahara ohne die Zustimmung des Volkes der Westsahara durchgeführt wird. Dies unterstreicht, warum auch Anwält:innen und Rechtsberater:innen an die Leitprinzipien der Vereinten Nationen für Wirtschaft und Menschenrechte gebunden sind: Sie sind nicht nur Anwält:innen ihrer Mandanten, sondern auch „Gatekeeper“, die dafür verantwortlich sind, dass das Verhalten von Unternehmen mit den internationalen Menschenrechten und dem humanitären Völkerrecht im Einklang steht.
„Es ist schwer nachvollziehbar, wie eine Kanzlei, die behauptet, Rechtsberatung und Anleitung zu verstärkter Sorgfaltspflicht im Bereich der Menschenrechte anzubieten, gleichzeitig eine so offen politische Position einnehmen und das Völkerrecht im Fall der Westsahara so selektiv anwenden kann. Vor diesem Hintergrund empfiehlt WSRW, den Stellungnahmen von Global Diligence in Fragen des Völkerrechts oder der verstärkten Sorgfaltspflicht sowie den Argumenten von Unternehmen, die sich auf deren Arbeit in diesem Gebiet stützen, kein Gewicht beizumessen“, erklärte WSRW.
Dieses Muster spiegelt einen umfassenderen, zutiefst beunruhigenden Trend wider. Wie Wayne Jordash im selben Online-Seminar feststellte, ist eine Besatzung per Definition vorübergehend. In der Westsahara weigern sich jedoch sowohl die Besatzungsmacht als auch ein Unternehmen, das Global Diligence beauftragt hat, den Status des Gebiets als besetzt und als Hoheitsgebiet ohne Selbstregierung anzuerkennen.
WSRW ist bekannt, dass Engie gegenüber seinen Investoren erwähnt hat, dass es WSRW über seine Pläne in der Westsahara auf dem Laufenden hält. Dies ist falsch. Die vollständige Kommunikation mit Engie ist auf unserer Website verfügbar.
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ANNOTATED TRANSCRIPT
[Minute 25:30 to 41:00 are of Richard Rogers, Global Diligence]
[00:24:57]
(presenter) Let’s now turn to Richard who will discuss his work in Western Sahara, including the complexities surrounding the unresolved status of the region and the approach that companies should take to ensure compliance with human rights norms.
[00:25:12]
(GD) [...] I am the founding partner of Global Diligence, which is a legal advisory firm. We specialise in international criminal law and international human rights and as part of that we offer assistance to businesses who are seeking to operate in these complex zones including Western Sahara. So I'll be talking about some of the key challenges for businesses who are interested in operating in Western Sahara
[00:26:00]
(GD) I have worked on three projects now. Each one has raised its own unique issue. And with quite different forms of assessments. But one thing has been consistent. And that is the political sensitivity and the legal complexity of the environment.
[00:26:30]
(GD) The businesses I work with have been involved with industries such as renewable energy, desalination, agriculture. And they sought our assistance at the early stages of the project so they could comply with their human rights obligations.
(WSRW comment) The “stakeholder consultation” started in 2021, over two years after Engie and its partner - a company owned by the Moroccan king - had won a tender for the project in the occupied territory.
[00:26:53]
(GD) Now, what I’d like to focus on today is the broader question relating to the human right of self-determination. That is key to this type of context. It helps us answer the essential question of whether businesses are even allowed to operate in Western Sahara at all in any capacity however beneficial it might be.
[00:27:16]
(GD) The other human rights are important and need to be dealt with on a more granular level, but the place to start is an assessment of self-determination. And that requires us to understand the legal status.
[00:27:40]
(GD) In the case of Western Sahara this is where it gets really tricky. It has an unresolved status. It's not even clear whether we are talking about an occupied territory or not. That depends on who you ask. If you ask Morocco, United States, Israel, it's not occupied. If you ask Algeria, South Africa, and many other countries, it is occupied. And it's a changing landscape as many of these situations are.
(WSRW comment) The current status of Western Sahara is clear. The territory is defined as non-self-governing, documented by international courts and the UN. Whether an occupation exists is not a political question but a question of facts, i.e. exercise of effective control outside of internationally recognized borders.
The status of occupied is also addressed by inter alia :
As is the case with the other rulings and opinions issued of international courts, Global Diligence makes no mention of this.
[00:28:08]
(GD) But I think for businesses it is best to work on the assumption that they will be operating in an occupied territory.
[00:28:17]
(GD) In terms of, sort of, the more factual or legal context, Morocco administers 75 percent of the territory.
(WSRW comment) For the rest of the presentation there is not much more “legal context”.
There is, for instance, no discussion surrounding the legal status of Morocco’s presence in the territory. The only specific reference is the mention of the UN 2002 Legal Opinion, which, we will see, is incorrectly referred to.
[00:28:25]
(GD) It claims that it owns the whole territory and refers to that as the “Southern Provinces”. It has an autonomy plan that it issued in 2007 which allows the populations of Western Sahara to enjoy self-determination through making the region this semi-autonomous area but ultimately under Moroccan sovereignty.
[00:28:50]
(GD) So according to the autonomy plan, and I quote, “the Sahara populations will themselves run their affairs democratically through legislative, executive and judicial bodies enjoying exclusive powers.” But ultimately Morocco would deal with defence and foreign affairs etc.
[00:29:13]
(GD) But despite these efforts to find a solution, there has been armed resistance on and off since the 1970s, led by the Polisario Front and supported by Algeria and indirectly Russia.
(WSRW comment) Notice that there is no critique or problematic comment or distancing to the autonomy plan throughout, stating, uncritically that the “plan […] allows […] the populations [...] to enjoy self-determination making the region….”.
The positive spin of Morocco’s “efforts” is presented in opposition to the negative portrayal of Polisario’s stance “despite these efforts”. Polisario is, in fact, the only of the two parties that has a position in line with international courts and signed peace agreements, and while Morocco is the one that caused the conflict through a continued, illegal, unjustified occupation, in violation of the 1975 ICJ Advisory Opinion.
Notice that Global Diligence’s only reference to efforts of “solution” in the above-mentioned, is Morocco’s plan to integrate Western Sahara into Morocco. There is no mention, for instance, to the signed peace accords on referendum on independence under the auspices of the UN, which Morocco backed out from, and which the UN has spent millions of dollars to implement.
In this context it is worth underlining:
* The reference to Western Sahara as a “region” is in line with Morocco’s terminology, not with international courts.
* It is not the “population” (or the “populations”) that has the right to self-determination. It is a territory’s people, which is fundamentally different, which have been mostly displaced as ruled in the 2024 CJEU rulings, whereas “the majority of the current population of Western Sahara is not part of the people holding the right to self-determination, namely the people of Western Sahara” (Joint cases C-789/19 and C-799/19, paras 127-128).
* The plan was not “issued” in 2007, but rather “aired”. Few seem to know the content. Its lack of clarity which was underlined by the UN Special Envoy to the UNSC in 2024.
* The absence of possibility in the autonomy plan to reject it in a genuine self-determination.
[00:29:30]
(GD) The position of the Polisario Front is, in essence, that the territory is under illegal Moroccan occupation and that any business operations no matter how beneficial are illegal and immoral.
(WSRW comment) Notice the absence of legal context - for example, no reference is made to the conclusions and rulings in CJEU, the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights on the occupation of the territory or the High Court of South Africa ruling on phosphate plunder in Western Sahara.
It is not for Morocco or European companies to determine who should benefit or what constitutes a benefit. That right rests solely with the Saharawi people. It is also obfuscating to not explain that Polisario advocates for self-determination in its fullest form: that is more options than only “autonomy”. Global Diligence is presenting a narrative that portrays Morocco as the one “seeking a solution” and the Saharawis as being the difficult party.
[00:29:44]
(GD) The situation on the ground now is very peaceful. But it is worth remembering that the Moroccan military built the second largest wall in the world, the bern (sic) wall, and they built that around the area they control. And they have a hundred thousand soldiers guarding that part of Western Sahara. So it's obviously not that peaceful.
(WSRW comment) This is controversial, particularly given the complete absence of any reference to democratic deficit.
Yes, there are soldiers along the berm. But security personnel are all over the occupied territory, ensuring a complete dark spot in terms of political freedoms.
The Special procedures of the Human Rights council has not been allowed to visit the territory for a decade. Independent journalists, researchers, lawyers, and Members of Parliament of the European Union are rarely allowed to access the territory if they wish to meet with Saharawis.
[00:30:10]
(GD) The Polisario Front, and I think it's fair to say an ever decreasing number of states, claim that only full independence from Morocco will satisfy self-determination of the people there. Other Saharawi groups are much more supportive of Morocco’s administration and their autonomy plan and the UN itself doesn’t add complete clarity. It officially considers Western Sahara to be a non-self-governing territory where the process of self-determination remains to be completed, but on the other hand, the UN Security Council has issued over 30 resolutions on Western Sahara and the last time it mentioned the word “occupation” was 45 years ago.
(WSRW comment) The UN clearly addresses Polisario as the representative of the Saharawi people. The CJEU finds Polisario to represent the Saharawi people legally. Global Diligence here conflates Polisario with “other Saharawi groups”. Would Global Diligence juxtapose pro-Russian groups in Crimea with the government of Kyiv?
[00:31:05]
(GD) In fact, the more recent UN Security Council resolutions have spoken much more about Morocco’s autonomy plan and seem to find that very credible. So to add into this already complex mix, in December 2020 the US and Israel recognise Morocco’s full sovereignty over Western Sahara.
(WSRW comment) The Tweet of recognition from president Donald Trump in 2020 and the position of the Israeli government are both interesting, politically speaking, but in WSRW’s opinion it does not make the legal analysis of the companies more complex.
[00:31:30]
(GD) To sum up, in practical terms, it is generally accepted that the idea of full independence is no longer seen as viable by the UN, by Morocco, by most European nations, by the United States and by others. Internal self-determination in line with Morocco’s autonomy plan is considered to be the only serious and credible way forward at this stage. So where does that leave us in terms of self-determination and business operations? Well, as we have seen, the law is very messy, but for businesses wanting to operate, it's safest to consider Western Sahara as an occupied territory where self-determination will ultimately be addressed internally with Morocco as the administrative power.
(WSRW comment) The last sentence is fascinating and full of contradictions.
The first part of that sentence concludes that enterprises should view the territory as under occupation. But notice that nothing in Global Diligence’s presentation addresses IHL or Morocco’s illegal presence in the territory in violation of IHL. Or its lack of sovereignty/mandate as concluded by CJEU.
The second part of the sentence “...where self-determination will ultimately…” suggests that
companies should today relate to the territory as a function of a hypothetical, possibly enforced political position for the future.
WSRW finds it unhelpful to expect corporations to base today’s human rights compliance in view of how a status “will ultimately be” politically in the future.
But the confusion does not stop there: the companies are asked to address Morocco as “administrative power”. What is that? “Administrative power” is not the same as the legal role/mandate as “administering power” over a non-self-governing territory under the UN Charter. Administering powers of non-self-governing territories have clear international legal status and obligations under international law.
Adding the term “administrative power” into the mix is unfortunate in a lecture that seeks to provide legal clarity.
A last twist for this hypothetical future scenario is that Global Diligence suggests that companies need to relate to the possibility that there is a case of “internal” self-determination. Considering that both the UN and the international courts rule that the non-self-governing territory is separate and distinct from its colonial powers in general, and that Western Sahara is separate and distinct from the neighboring country of Morocco, the concept of “internal” self-determination is meaningless.
Internal self-determination - a concept often invoked in relation to indigenous peoples - is not how international courts or the United Nations have addressed the matter. The Saharawi people are not an indigenous people in Morocco, seeking more administrative control over ancestral lands - they have the right to self-determination and independence in relation to Western Sahara, which is their national territory in accordance with the law of decolonization.
Lastly, one can wonder how Global Diligence is reflecting around the relationship about the current and future legal status in the above, to the “test” that Global Diligence will apply below. The “test” does not at all relate to the situation as occupied, as Global Diligence says companies should address it as. Nor does the “test” relate to the “internal” self-determination. Nor does the “test” consider Morocco being “administrative” or “administering” power. So the “test” below does not match the framework that Global Diligence has just laid out.
[00:32:20]
(GD) That does not mean that businesses cannot lawfully operate there, despite what the Polisario Front will tell you. It does mean that businesses should act with extra caution and sensitivity and help ensure that they do not contribute to human rights violations of the local people.
(WSRW comment) “Lawfully”, according to whom? Which country’s legislation? Moroccan domestic law? The only place where Global Diligence is seen to expand on Morocco’s legal standing in the territory, is where it suggests Western Sahara is occupied, meaning, Morocco is occupier. Apart from that, Global Diligence does not expand on the legal framework a company should operate under in an occupied territory where the occupying power rejects being an occupying power. Everything in the rest of the lecture - including the alleged ‘test’ - fails to apply that framework.
[00:32:40]
(GD) So what does this extra caution look like in practice and how should businesses approach this issue from the start? Well, thankfully, we do have some guidance on this. In 2002, the UN’s most senior lawyer, Hans Corell, was asked to clarify the conditions for lawful resource exploitation in Western Sahara. So the very issue that many businesses are interested in. And in his legal opinion, he laid out a test, which I think is widely accepted as a standard to be applied in such situations. And, he basically stated that in non-self-governing territories, resource exploitation conducted for the benefit of the peoples of those territories, and on their behalf or in consultation with their representatives, is compatible with the UN Charter and the obligations of the administering power.
(WSRW comment) Global Diligence’s reading of the Corell Opinion is misleading. The statement by Global Diligence reflects the eternal misrepresentation of the Corell Opinion, which has been thoroughly rebutted by the EU Court of Justice. The EU Commission and Council used the same arguments that are used here by Global Diligence: as long as the exploitation is to the benefit of the people, and there is a consultation, it is allegedly compatible with international law.
A) Global Diligence does not refer to the conclusion of the UN legal opinion (§25), but in practice refers to the content of §24, out of context.
B) By applying the expressions “In such situations” and “in non-self-governing territories…” Global Diligence is misrepresenting the UN document. The Opinion clearly lays out the general obligations for administering powers over its colonies. However, and this is important, the opinion underlines that Morocco is not the administering power.
The case is unique, and the legal text is made by analogy. By addressing the opinion as one of many cases internationally of similar situation, Global Diligence fails to take into account a fundamental part of the opinion. In fact, Western Sahara is the only non-self-governing territory in the world, the only case internationally - where a colony has no functioning administering power.
The CJEU (§388, 2021 ruling on trade) underlines this aspect of analogy in the UN Legal Opinion. Corell later underlined in a lecture what this means for Morocco in Western Sahara. “Any limitation of the powers of such an entity acting in good faith, would certainly apply a fortiori to an entity that did not qualify as an administering power but de facto administered the territory”, Corell later clarified.
C) A couple of other important remarks by the CJEU are left out by Global Diligence:
* As concluded by the EU Court of Justice, the Corell Opinion concludes that the exploration or exploitation would be in violation of international law if not undertaken in accordance with the wishes and the interests of the people of Western Sahara. It does not express how those interests and wishes are to be considered (e.g. through a consultation). (§312 and §387, 2021 ruling on trade)
* The UN Legal Opinion is not the most authoritative source on the right to self-determination in Western Sahara. As noted by the CJEU, the UN Legal Opinion is not equivalent to advisory opinions delivered in accordance with Article 96 of that charter by the ICJ, the principal judicial body of the United Nations under Article 92 of that charter, which determine the law applicable to the question at hand (the Court here refers to the ICJ ruling on Chagos). (§386, 2021 ruling on trade)
* Even if Corell was applicable, the EU’s approach would still be in violation to international law, as it must not only be consistent with the interests of the people, “but also with their will”. (§389, 2021 ruling on trade).
In its ruling in joint cases C-789/19 and C-799/19 (paras. 137-138), the CJEU explicitly denied the very possibility of the European Commission to rely ever again on the 2002 UN legal opinion by ruling that “the letter of 29 January 2002 from the United Nations Legal Counsel [...] does not constitute a source of EU law which can be relied on before the EU judicature, given that it is not akin, as such, either to a rule of international treaty law which is binding on the European Union or to a rule of customary international law.”,
[00:33:45]
(GD) So this is a safe test to apply for any operations even if it doesn't involve resource exploitation. So when designing for this broad issue, we basically need to determine: is the operation beneficial to the Saharawi people concerned with the project; is it being done in consultation with or in partnership with their representatives.
(WSRW comment) As explained by the EU Court of Justice, it is not a safe test (see above).
In addition, how can benefits to the Saharawis be established, in the current context? As stated by the EU Court of Justice: “a majority of the population of Western Sahara is not part of the people holding the right to self-determination, namely the people of Western Sahara. That people, which for the most part has been displaced, is the sole holder of the right to self-determination with regard to the territory of Western Sahara. The right to self-determination belongs to that people, and not to the population of that territory in general, of which - according to the estimates provided by the Commission at the hearing before the Court of Justice - only 25% is of Sahrawi origin.” (§128, 2024 ruling on trade).
It also establishes that “there is a difference in that regard between the concept of the ‘population’ of a non-self-governing territory and of the ‘people’ of that territory. The latter refers to a political unit which holds the right to self-determination, whereas the concept of ‘population’ refers to the inhabitants of a territory.” (§129, 2024 ruling on trade).
Notice how Global Diligence started out the lecture by stating it needed to analyse the Saharawi right to self-determination - which is a collective right for the entire people. Now, Global Diligence has massively reduced the concept to the “Saharawi people concerned with the project”.
As to the point of “consultation with or in partnership with their representatives”, it is worth noticing that consultation cannot be regarded as equivalent to the right to consent, as per the right to self-determination.
[00:34:15]
(GD) So let’s have a look at how we applied that test in practice.
[00:34:22]
(GD) So, first, it was important to understand the context, and this involved studying a whole range of documents from Morocco's autonomy plan: prior reports relating to the specific projects, court rulings relating to Western Sahara and their applicability to private businesses, recent human rights reports…
(WSRW comment) The autonomy plan doesn’t really exist as such to “study”. It is more of an idea. The absence of a real autonomy plan was commented on by the UN Special Envoy to Western Sahara, Staffan de Mistura, to the UN Security Council in October 2024.
Notice that Global Diligence in its lecture not once refers to the rulings of international courts, but makes five references to Morocco’s political plan to include the territory into Morocco, and each time in a positive context.
[00:34:42]
(GD) And it was also important to undertake stakeholder engagement: with UN bodies there, with Moroccan ministries, with the Polisario Front or the civil society organizations who support them… And, of course, and most importantly: with the representatives of the people themselves.
(WSRW comment) Two things. First, the way this is presented, tends to conclude that Global Diligence means that Polisario Front is not representing the Saharawi people, but that the people have other representatives.
Second, and this is spectacular, Global Diligence namedrops Polisario Front in a public speech as an instition that has taken part in a stakeholder engagement. Why would Polisario have wanted to take part in such an engagement? WSRW struggles to believe that this is true. To what WSRW has managed to establish, Polisario has not been part of the stakeholder engagement.
Global Diligence does the same by stating that un-named civil society organisations have taken part. It resembles the process that the EU commission undertook, when it claimed to have been undertaking stakeholder engagement, while in fact it hadn’t. For the EU’s stakeholder engagement, we refer to our WSRW report “Above the Law” (2020).
WSRW has never heard of a civil society organisation advocating for self-determination being part of Global Diligence stakeholder analysis undertaken on behalf of clients who work in partnership with the Moroccan government.
It can be added that in 2025, WSRW learnt that investors were informed by Engie that it has briefed WSRW about its progress in the territory. This is misleading. Engie fails to answer hardly any question it has been asked, nor responded at all to our latest letter. See the complete WSRW-Engie correspondence here.
[00:35:04]
(GD) Choosing the representatives was not straightforward either. It’s an extremely sensitive question; there are very strong views about who represents the Sahwari (sic) people — who represents them generally? Who represents them in the region of the operation? Of course, Morocco claims to represent all residents, but that is legally and politically contested, and it’s the same with the Polisario Front. And we confirm through interaction and desk research that the maximalist position of the Polisario Front remained unchanged and unhelpful to the benefit analysis.
(WSRW comment) Notice how Global Diligence here juxtaposes the claims of Morocco with Polisario in terms of the solidity of its legal and political claims.
It is correct that Morocco’s legal claims are legally contested - being rejected in 1975 by ICJ, then by numerous UN resolutions, as well as by CJEU from 2016-2024, by African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights in 2022. Polisario’s representativity, on the other hand, has never been legally contested, except by the EU Commission during the 2012-2024 the CJEU proceedings - a claim that was rejected by the Court. As such, juxtaposing the two entities’ legal recognition is misleading.
The “maximalist position” - a referendum on self-determination where independence is one of the options on the table - is the only solution that so far has been accepted by both parties to the conflict.
This argumentation - that Polisario’s political position is “unhelpful” for a benefit analysis - is identical to how the EU Commission argues in its Staff Working Document in 2018. This line of argument is not in line with the one of the CJEU.
[00:35:47]
(GD) And there were real questions about whether the Polisario front was acting in good faith, given that they prefer absolutely no investment whatsoever - even if it benefits the Saharawi people. So, what became clear was that there is no single representative person or body for all the Saharawi people, so we decided to undertake a more nuanced assessment of the real stakeholders relating to the given project. So… who were the communities actually affected by the projects?
(WSRW comment) Would Global Diligence claim that the Kyiv government fails to act in “good faith” when it comes to Russian investments in Crimea even if it benefits Ukrainians on the peninsula?
The claim that “there is no single representative person or body for all the Saharawi people” makes sense if one ignores the UN resolutions referring to Polisario as the representative of the Saharawi people, and the CJEU rulings that clearly states that Polisario has legal standing to represent the Saharawi people in EU Courts.
Notice how Global Diligence here introduces the word “communities”. Global Diligence is here again replacing the collective right to self-determination over such projects with the rights of those who happen to be affected very locally.
The criticism that Frente Polisario is “unhelpful” or “not acting in good faith” because it rejects investments raises a troubling question: is Global Diligence suggesting that people are not allowed to say no to projects on their own land? Even if others claim those projects would be “beneficial,” does that strip the people of the right to withhold consent? The right to refuse is fundamental to self-determination. If the recognized representative body of the Saharawi people opposes a deal, dismissing its stance by declaring there is “no single representative” is not a neutral observation - it is a way of invalidating their voice altogether.
[00:36:28]
(GD) Where did they live, how were they represented, etc.? And, for example, in the southern area of Dakhla, which is home to many Sahwari (sic) people, the region has a political system that is fundamentally democratic. The regional government is comprised both of elected and appointed officials, and for the projects operating in that region, in Dakhla, we felt satisfied that these actors, the vast majority of them being Sahwari (sic), were the representatives of the people for the purposes of the benefit analysis.
(WSRW comment) It is called “Saharawi”, not “Sahwari”.
According to the CJEU (§128, 2024 ruling on trade), some 75% of the population in the territory today are from Morocco, and only 25% are from Western Sahara, whereas most of the Saharawis have fled. WSRW believes the proportion is way lower than 25% in Dakhla. Most Saharawis in the occupied territory live today in the capital city of El Aaiún, and very few in Dakhla, where they are a highly marginalised community.
There is a leap in argument. Global Diligence started the lecture by defining the territory as under occupation. However, by now, it seems that Global Diligence recognises Moroccan elections outside of Morocco’s internationally recognised borders. This leap is not explained. Western Sahara scores among the lowest in the world on political freedoms.
As long as the UN and international courts clarify that Polisario represents the Saharawi people, it is unclear how Global Diligence, from a legal perspective, came to a “feeling” of satisfaction that they found some other institution in Moroccan government institutions.
[00:37:14]
(GD) We met those representatives in Dakhla: we discussed the projects, we discussed any concerns. We met people like regional directors of agriculture, presidents of the regions, MPs, or Sahwari (sic) people. And in all three projects the representatives were supportive of the investments and, depending on the project, they stressed issues such as the desperate need for affordable fresh water in the region. They pointed out that the conditions were perfect for agriculture if they had fresh water for irrigation.
(WSRW comment) This is the first indication that Global Diligence travelled into the occupied territory. Who gave them the permission? Did Global Diligence obtain consent from the people of the territory prior to undertaking it, or was it only done in dialogue with the Moroccan government?
With “presidents of the regions”, WSRW expects this most likely refers to the “president of the regional councils”. An occupying power has no right to divide the occupied territory into administrative units treating it as anything other than separate from its own country. This is part of the IHL analysis that the Global Diligence presentation does not address.
It is interesting that Global Diligence was allowed to travel to the territory. The OHCHR has not been granted access to the territory since 2015 despite its repeated requests for a visit in line with Security Council resolutions, most recently resolution 2756 (2024). The UN Secretary General has urged that the lack of independent, impartial, comprehensive and sustained human rights monitoring remains a major obstacle to comprehensively assessing the situation. International observers, including parliamentarians, researchers, journalists and lawyers, reportedly continue to face entry restrictions, with dozens denied entry or expelled during the reporting period.
The UN Secretary General denounced in his report of 2024 - and whilst deploring the shrinking civic space - that his office received reports of exploitation of natural resources in Western Sahara without meaningful consultations and participation by affected communities. Reports described investments as frequently prioritizing interests that do not address the needs of the local Sahrawis, exacerbating economic disparity and hindering equitable development for all Sahrawis.
In 2025, the UN Secretary General repeated his concerns to the UN General Assembly, noting that on 20 March, United Nations special procedure mandate holders sent a communication to Morocco, expressing concerns over alleged violations affecting 79 Sahrawi activists. In the communication, they also referred to alleged human rights violations linked to coastal development projects that entail large-scale land acquisition, destruction of private property and displacement.
[00:37:58]
(GD) They expressed how important it was to create new jobs in the region, particularly for young people, and to diversify away from commercial fishing, which is the main industry. They talked about how the youth were now well trained in agriculture and business, but didn't have enough jobs. They talked about how clean energy would be important, not just to run the project itself, but to feed into other areas: providing energy for Dakhla. They hoped that this type of investment would lead to social improvements.
(WSRW comment) An effect of the Engie project that Global Diligence has aided, is, according to documents that WSRW obtained, to secure people to move to Dakhla. https://wsrw.org/en/news/engie-consistent-in-ignoring-international-law
[00:38:40]
(GD) They hoped that the refugees would eventually come back and participate in this life and reap some of the benefits from this investment. So basically, certainly, in relation to the projects that that we assessed, we found that, for the Sahwaris (sic) currently in the region, there were clear benefits that were likely to enhance their self-determination: enhance them to freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development. For the returning Sahwaris (sic), their right to return was unaffected by the particular projects that we looked at.
(WSRW comment) Here, there is a leap in argumentation.
It is not explained how aiding Engie with a project that will move, perhaps, thousands of Moroccan farmers into the territory, will aid the Saharawis obtaining self-determination (“likely to enhance their self-determination”). The only way this makes sense is that the right to self-determination is interpreted in a different way than what it normally means in terms of that right in the context of a people of a non-self-governing territory.
[00:39:23]
(GD) And they too were likely to benefit, if and when they did come back. And, for the Sahwaris (sic) living east of the bern (sic) line, the project had no bearing on their self-determination. And, of course, we made a whole number of recommendations to each of the companies to help ensure that the situation was properly monitored, and that the company could adapt to any changes. And, of course, as I discussed at the beginning, this was just an assessment of the bigger question of self-determination.
(WSRW comments) Global Diligence here views the return into the occupied territory as a precondition to benefit. This is in contradiction to the CJEU rulings. It should be added that Global Diligence finds the court rulings “apply to state-to-state relations pursuant to established principles of public international law, which is not directly binding on private entities.” It is interesting that Global Diligence is so unaligned with the interpretation of the court.
[00:40:01]
(GD) And, on top of that, the businesses needed to carry out much more granular assessments of the other human rights issues, whether they be labor, health, environment, freedom of association, etc.
[00:40:15]
(GD) Yes, so, just to wrap up, I think that Western Sahara is a very good example that demonstrates the complexities of operating in regions of unresolved status, where the legal ambiguity, the political sensitivities, and the human rights risks all collide together.
(WSRW comment) There is not much legal ambiguity today in terms of the status of the territory. There are two sets of legal frameworks that can be applied, the one of IHL for the part that is under foreign occupation - and the one on non-self-governing territories, where the people have right to self-determination and independence.
The Global Diligence presentation does not analyse the first, and only selectively addresses the second.
Regarding the formulation “good example”: There are no other cases internationally with a non-self-governing territory, without an administering power assuming its role, partially occupied by another country, and where international courts underline the rights of the people to self-determination in line with the UN Charter.
[00:40:41]
(GD) The region definitely needs investment and, if it's done right, it can provide a real benefit to the local people. Thank you very much.
(WSRW comment) Western Sahara is not a “region” according to the international courts. That is Moroccan terminology. Western Sahara is a non-self-governing “territory”. Global Diligence does not refer to Ukraine as a “region”.
[00:40:50]
(Presenter) Wonderful. Thank you so much, Richard. Some really interesting points that came out there, and interesting to hear more about your work in Western Sahara. We now have 20 or 18 minutes until the end of this webinar, which we are dedicating to Q&A so that we can answer any of those more complex, tricky questions.
[00:41:11]
(Presenter) That maybe we can do live rather than through writing, so I do encourage everyone to put their questions into the Q&A section at the bottom of the chat. But to kick us off, maybe we can just talk about how businesses can negotiate these complexities in terms of, also, commissioning some of these assessments. When is the right time for them to start engaging maybe experts or external organizations outside to start assessing some of these risks that both Wayne, you, and Richard have been speaking about during your panel? Wayne, maybe I'll turn to you first and then Richard.
[00:42:02]
(Wayne Jordash) When is the right time? You know, let me answer that by saying or talking about heightened due diligence. As I indicated during my presentation we are talking about four essential steps.
[00:42:18]
(Wayne Jordash) The first step is assessment of the conflict, or, in this instance, the occupation, or purported occupation. Step two is the assessment of the impact, or likely impact, of business activities on the conflict. Third step is identifying the business impact on human rights — that's through a human rights risk assessment. And step four, which is, of course, the most important bit, which is acting to meet the responsibilities which have been clarified during the first three steps.
[00:42:54]
(Wayne Jordash) That’s planning, implementing, and evaluating the business activities accordingly. And so, you are talking about a pretty complicated process. A full spectrum, heightened, due diligence process calls upon the business to really look at the dynamics of the occupation, which, of course, can be changing and evolving, and to take further steps to try to understand effectively how those activities, how those products that the businesses produce, how the use of resources by the business impacts the dynamics of the conflict or any human rights violations that are occurring.
[00:43:49]
(Wayne Jordash) So, you know, these are extremely complicated inquiries, and require, in many instances, deep investigations. And, so, simple answer: the sooner you get going, the sooner you get to bottom out some of these complex answers. And, you know, there are some due diligence which can be conducted perhaps without calling in third party experts, but I doubt very much whether a business can conduct these assessments themselves relying upon their internal resources.
[00:44:31]
(Wayne Jordash) And so, the sooner the right experts are hired, the better. And that, of course, should be before any business activities; that's just logical. And, most importantly, it should be a periodical process. Once conducted, that is not the end of it, because, as I made the point and as Richard has clarified, the situation evolves. And so, what happens today…
[00:45:03]
(Wayne Jordash) I mean, Israel in the occupied Palestinian territories is a very good example. You know, what was happening pre-October 7th is quite different to what is happening October 7th, or at least has the potential to be significantly different. So, it's as soon as possible and as often as is necessary.
[00:45:23]
(Presenter) Very interesting. I'll turn to you, Richard, quickly for your reflections, and then we've got a question in the chat.
[00:45:31]
(GD) Yeah, I don't have much to add. I think there's certainly nothing wrong with doing this type of assessment up front. But, in the cases that we worked on, the businesses had already been in the planning stage for years beforehand but had not started operating, so they hadn't,..certainly committed any human rights violations. But they had undertaken these massive projects. And they had undertaken commercial assessments, they had done environmental impact assessments, they had spent a lot of time meeting the various partners and planning the operation.
[00:46:12]
(GD) And, I guess it was at that stage where they felt that they were ready to go ahead, that they brought in the outside experts to say: okay give us a give us a plan for this for the complexities of the human rights issues that we face. um and that's a that's a perfectly reasonable way to do it, I think. So, as long as you get that assessment before you start to build, then that's absolutely fine. And there can be quite a lead time before that happens for the big projects.
(WSRW comment) WSRW believes that a heightened due diligence study should be done earlier, for instance prior to even starting planning, even prior to signing the agreement, for instance to ascertain whether one has signed with the government of the right country. The time that Global Diligence came in to undertake studies for Engie, the latter had already an agreement with the government of Morocco, which has no sovereignty or international mandate to be present in the territory. The “stakeholder consultation” started in 2021, over two years after Engie and its partner - a company owned by the Moroccan king - had won a tender for the project.
[00:46:45]
(Presenter) Great. Thank you very much. And, um, Wayne, I'll turn to you first about with this question due to its focus on Israel: for a corporate sustainability professional working in a multinational company with operations in Israel subsidiary sales, etc., what are some ways to raise awareness to question or challenge business activities in an illegal occupier? What would be some tips for middle management in a company that is profit driven? Thank you
[00:47:18]
(Wayne Jordash) Raise awareness to whom?
[00:47:21]
(Presenter) Yeah, so I think what this question is driving at is: how do you get that internal buy-in in a business that is profit driven, that is operating in this sort of situation in Israel? What are some ways to raise awareness internally, or question or challenge the business activities that are at the core of a business?
[00:47:45]
(Presenter) And particularly with middle management, those that are trying to drive change, perhaps, in the business… I think we've seen a number of examples in our own work where this has been the challenge in terms of getting the internal buy-in to conduct this sort of assessment prior to, perhaps, some more kind of formal pressure coming from externals.
[00:48:05]
(Wayne Jordash) So, yeah, well, it's certainly, as you say, Lara, a feature of our work, which is, you know, middle management or sustainability teams, showing huge enthusiasm for heightened due diligence and for ensuring that the business activities are responsible. And then, after the initial enthusiasm, a roadblock occurs, which is that the executive board or the top management suddenly get shy about those activities. There's no simple solution, of course. Every company is different. Every company has a different culture. Every company has different relationships between middle management and above. But, you know, from an advisory perspective, what we try to do is make the law less scary, make it more understandable. You know, many occupations may well involve violations, but many occupations may not amount to annexations. And so, there is room to maneuver in terms of business activities, in terms of labor, relationships with the occupied people, in terms of what we've been discussing: the best interests of the population.
[00:49:46]
(Wayne Jordash) And so, you know, there can be no blanket assumption that working in an occupation involves human rights violations. However, of course, the more the violations stack up, the more it begins to look like an annexation, the more it looks like systemic or systematic violations, the more that it becomes more difficult for businesses to operate.
[00:50:14]
(Wayne Jordash) So, I think the starting point, certainly from companies like ours and beyond, is to try to explain these things as simply as possible, and not overcomplicate issues by dressing things up in legal language. I hope I didn't do that! What I was trying to do was really sort of try to explain to businesses that there is a way through this. It requires work, it requires explanation, it requires clarification, but there is a way through this.
[00:50:44]
(Wayne Jordash) And a way to do business in many occupations in a responsible way. And so, um, I think, to me, I mean, that's as good as I can explain, which is how we try to persuade executive boards and top management that their best interests lie in doing this analysis and making sure that they put themselves in the best position to maneuver through what may be worrying violations, but are not made less worrying because they're ignored.
[00:51:18]
(Presenter) Yeah, and to whoever… it was an anonymous question, but to whoever wrote that question, if you would like any case studies of why proactive rather than reactive assessments are better, we can provide them to you, so if you ever need the kind of reasoning that you can sell internally, we do have some good examples of that. I wonder whether maybe, Richard, I can pose this other question to you in the interest of time, just so that we can try and answer as many as possible, unless you have um any other comments on that question which feel free to add.
[00:51:50]
(Presenter) But, how important do you think robust internal whistleblowing arrangements are for a business to monitor compliance with, and identify breaches of HRL and other laws during operations in occupied territories?
[00:52:05]
(GD) Well, I mean, so, first of all, you would hope that it wouldn't be necessary to have whistleblowers exposing the abuses of a business if the business had had a proper human rights assessment and proper advice and had followed that advice. And they had their policies in place, they had their monitoring in place, etc., etc…
[00:52:28]
(GD) But I think that whistleblowers do have a place, um, in certain contexts, in certain businesses, because it can be very difficult for people from the outside to understand what's going on on the inside. If you're in a very complex environment… let's choose another one: Eastern Congo. At the moment, where there are business operations going on from Western companies, it's very difficult to know what they're actually doing, because it's a very dangerous and high-risk area to go.
[00:53:06]
(Richard Rogers) So, there’s very little monitoring. So that I think whistleblowers do have a place in certain contexts and can be very valuable. But, again, you would hope that responsible companies would not be worried about that, because they would have to be abiding by the human rights rules.
00:53:33
(Presenter) Thank you. In terms of the next question, something that's been posed in the chat and I'll put this one to you Wayne: considering a similar approach to the one that Richard has taken in Western Sahara, how do you think the businesses should operate on the Palestinian territory?
00:53:55
(Presenter) This person says: "I'm used to interpreting the law as imposing to cease every kind of operation in the OTP, as businesses usually disrespect the Palestinian population exploiting their labor and resources at cheap prices while fueling the Israeli economy -- and thus its crimes. But do you think some activities would benefit the Palestinian population?"
[00:54:19]
(Wayne Jordash) It's a very good question actually, and one that, I think, you know, only the Palestinian people can answer. In a sense, what I would say is this: the international rulings on the Israeli occupation of Palestinian land are very clear. There's not the kind of nuance that there may be in Western Sahara, which Richard addressed. The law is fairly clear and corroborated by a variety of sources and not just the International Court of Justice, which I referred to: Special rapporteurs, UN, academics, and so on.
[00:55:01]
(Wayne Jordash) So, the law really clarifies that Israel has annexed through settlements in the OPT, and that annexation rests upon a variety of violations of international humanitarian law, such as the forcible transfer of population, transfer of Israeli population into the occupied territories, the taking of resources which belong to the Palestinian people, violation of the right to self-determination, violation of the discrimination [sic], and so on and so forth.
[00:55:52]
(Wayne Jordash) So, let me put it this way: the room for businesses to maneuver in the occupied territories in light of these findings is very, very narrow. I wouldn't sit here and say that it's impossible to operate in the occupied territories, and particularly in the settlements, without violating one or more of these international rules… but it's very difficult. And I think the question does come down to why I think it's a great question: it comes down to, essentially, consent of the Palestinian people, which is why I can't answer that, you know.
[00:56:33]
(Wayne Jordash) So, you'd have to focus into the business activity, focus in/on where it is happening, focus into specifically what it does, and focus into whether the Palestinian population in that locality consent to and benefit from those business activities. It's a sliding spectre, of course, you know. And as I say, without a doubt, the room for maneuver of businesses is extremely narrow.
[00:56:56]
(Presenter) Brilliant, thank you. And with my eye on the clock I just want to give Richard the opportunity to answer this question: “Are there legal mechanisms available to seize the assets or profits of businesses operating in occupied territories where such profits result from unjust enrichment”
[00:57:14]
(Richard Rogers) Yeah, there's all sorts of potential legal action that can be taken. There's criminal action, using anti-money laundering laws and others. There's human rights sanctions regimes, there are all sorts of both criminal and civil actions and quasi-legal actions like sanctions.
[00:57:35]
(Richard Rogers) But of course, [for] those you have to persuade a significant country or region, like the EU, or the UK, or the US to impose those sanctions. For the criminal and civil actions you have to persuade prosecutors to go forward; for the civil actions you have to persuade judges to find your favour. There are actions, there are potential actions of course.
[00:58:01]
(Presenter) Wonderful, thank you. Well, I think that that's where we'll end the session for today. Thank you to both of our speakers for such a rich discussion and to everybody who joined our third session in our series on business operations in conflict-affected and high-risk areas.
[00:58:18]
(Presenter) We've covered a lot of ground, and we will circulate a few key takeaways and the recording after this session. I hope it has been helpful in giving you some practical insights and tools to help your businesses or organizations navigate these issues, and thank you again for being with us today. Thank you!
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Das Zertifizierungssystem MSC garantiert, dass keine Fischerei in der besetzten Westsahara zertifiziert sind. Spanische Lebensmittelunternehmen vermitteln jedoch einen anderen Eindruck.
Die französische Stadt Dreux erwägt, ein Urteil französischer Gerichte zu ignorieren und sich an einem umstrittenen Energieprojekt in der besetzten Westsahara zu beteiligen.
Die marokkanische Regierung hat mehrere Projekte für grünen Wasserstoff mit einer Gesamtleistung von 20 GW aus erneuerbaren Energien und bis zu 8 Millionen Tonnen Derivaten bestätigt – viele davon sind in der besetzten Westsahara geplant.
Eine Organisation, die sich für einen verantwortungsvollen Umgang mit Süßwasser einsetzt, unterstützt das umstrittene französisch-marokkanische Agrarunternehmen Azura in der besetzten Westsahara.