En avril dernier, le cabinet de conseil juridique Global Diligence a donné une présentation controversée qui offre un aperçu révélateur de la manière dont les entreprises justifient leur collaboration avec des intérêts commerciaux étrangers au Sahara Occidental occupé.

La présentation en ligne était organisée par le cabinet de conseil Beyond Human Rights Compliance. Basées à Londres, ces deux organisations sont spécialisées dans l'accompagnement d'autres entreprises en matière de diligence raisonnable renforcée en droits humains, sanctions et droit international humanitaire.

La session est disponible sur YouTube.

Intitulée « Entreprises responsables dans les territoires occupés : l'analyse juridique requise », la session a réuni deux intervenants, dont Richard Rogers, associé fondateur de Global Diligence. L'animateur a présenté la conférence de Global Diligence comme abordant les « complexités entourant le statut non résolu de la région et l'approche que les entreprises devraient adopter pour se conformer aux normes relatives aux droits humains », un langage qui préfigurait déjà les débats controversés qui allaient suivre.

L'introduction a notamment qualifié le Sahara Occidental de « région », un terme couramment utilisé par le gouvernement marocain, qui occupe illégalement une partie du territoire. L'ONU et les tribunaux internationaux définissent le Sahara Occidental comme un territoire non autonome aux frontières internationalement reconnues.

Au cours de cette conférence, Global Diligence a exposé le cadre juridique standard sur lequel les entreprises ont tendance à s'appuyer lorsqu'elles choisissent d'opérer sous licence marocaine dans le territoire occupé. Dep

uis 2021, Western Sahara Resource Watch (WSRW) est au courant du travail de Global Diligence pour les acteurs étrangers au Sahara Occidental occupé, mais cette présentation offre des informations rares et de première main sur la manière dont l'entreprise justifie ces opérations.

L'entreprise n'a pas détaillé, dans ses précédents échanges, son interprétation des aspects du droit international au Sahara Occidental. 

Lors du séminaire, Global Diligence a déclaré avoir travaillé sur trois projets au Sahara Occidental, couvrant les énergies renouvelables, le dessalement et l'agriculture, et avoir conseillé plusieurs entreprises. Jusqu'à présent, la seule mission connue publiquement était un travail pour l'entreprise française Engie en 2021. Sa mise en œuvre prochaine pourrait entraîner un afflux important de colons marocains dans le territoire occupé.

Le deuxième intervenant, Wayne Jordash, associé directeur de Beyond Human Rights Compliance, a présenté un cadre juridique et éthique plus nuancé pour les opérations en territoire occupé. Rogers et Jordash ont collaboré professionnellement dans d'autres contextes.

Avant de reproduire ci-dessous la transcription intégrale et annotée de la présentation de 15 minutes de Global Diligence, il convient de résumer les principales erreurs et déformations de son approche.
 

1) Global Diligence ignore les arrêts de la CJUE
Global Diligence ne fait aucune référence aux dix arrêts de la Cour de justice de l'Union européenne (2015-2024), qui confirment systématiquement le statut juridique international du Sahara Occidental, les droits du peuple sahraoui et la position juridique du Polisario comme représentant du peuple sahraoui. L'absence de toute référence à la jurisprudence de la CJUE est extraordinaire, en particulier pour un cabinet conseillant des entreprises basées dans l'UE. La Cour a jugé que l'accord UE-Maroc de 2018, en vertu duquel les produits agricoles du Sahara Occidental sont exportés vers l'Europe, a été conclu en violation du droit international - en particulier du droit du peuple sahraoui à l'autodétermination et de son droit au consentement. C'est précisément le commerce agricole que l'entreprise française Engie facilite par le biais de projets pour lesquels Global Diligence a fourni des conseils. La manière dont Global Diligence présente son argument central - selon lequel l'exploitation est autorisée en vertu du droit international si elle profite à la population locale - est incompatible avec les arrêts de la CJUE, qui mentionnent le consentement comme seul critère (explicite ou « présumé »). À noter que la Commission Européenne et le Conseil ont précédemment utilisé le même raisonnement erroné que celui présenté par Global Diligence. L'absence de réflexion sur les décisions de la plus haute juridiction européenne, dans une conférence consacrée aux aspects juridiques de l'activité des entreprises au Sahara Occidental, est déconcertante. Dans une correspondance antérieure avec WSRW, Global Diligence expliquait que « les décisions de la CJUE mentionnées dans votre réponse s’appliquent aux relations entre États conformément aux principes établis du droit international public, qui ne sont pas directement contraignant pour les entités privées. » Pourtant, le droit à l'autodétermination est un droit humain fondamental qui va précisément au-delà des relations interétatiques, et le principe de l'effet relatif des traités est un principe fondamental du droit contractuel présent dans tous les systèmes juridiques, y compris le droit marocain (voir article 228).
 

2) Global Diligence ignore l'arrêt de 2022 de la Cour africaine des droits de l'homme et des peuples concernant le Sahara Occidental
Le 22 septembre 2022, la Cour africaine des droits de l'homme et des peuples a rendu un arrêt historique concernant le Sahara Occidental, dans lequel :

• « La Cour relève que l'ONU et l'UA reconnaissent la situation de la RASD [c'est-à-dire du Sahara Occidental] comme une situation d’occupation et considèrent le territoire de celui-ci comme l’un des territoires dont le processus de décolonisation n’est pas encore totalement achevé » (§ 301).
• La Cour souligne que la « souveraineté » du peuple sahraoui « sur le territoire occupé » du Sahara Occidental est « un fait établi », excluant toute tentative de présenter le territoire comme étant contesté (§ 302).
• « La Cour souligne que l’occupation continue de la RASD [c’est-à-dire du Sahara Occidental] par le Maroc est incompatible avec le droit à l’autodétermination du peuple de la RASD [c’est-à-dire du Sahara Occidental - le peuple sahraoui] » (§ 303)
• « La Cour [...] réitère cependant [...] que tous les États membres de l'UA [y compris le Maroc] ont la responsabilité, en vertu du droit international, de trouver une solution permanente à l'occupation, d’assurer la jouissance du droit inaliénable du peuple sahraoui à l'autodétermination, et de ne rien faire qui puisse reconnaître cette occupation comme légale ou entraver la jouissance de ce droit » (§ 323).

Étant donné que la Cour Africaine est l'organe juridique des droits de l'homme de l'Union Africaine, doté d'une compétence spécifique en matière de droit à l'autodétermination, il est surprenant que Global Diligence ne fasse aucune référence à l'arrêt de la Cour de 2022.

Si elle devait conseiller les entreprises souhaitant investir en Crimée occupée, Global Diligence omettrait-elle de mentionner l'arrêt de la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme rendu le 25 juin 2024 affirmant qu'il ne concerne que les procédures interétatiques ?

3) L'avis juridique de l'ONU de 2002 est mal lu
L'ensemble du raisonnement du cabinet semble reposer sur une mauvaise lecture de l'avis du conseiller juridique de l'ONU de 2002, une interprétation erronée identique à celle énoncée par la Commission Européenne, puis rejetée par la CJUE. Au lieu de refléter la conclusion de l'avis, qui souligne la condition de l'obtention du consentement préalable du peuple sahraoui, Global Diligence cite des paragraphes antérieurs hors contexte.

En 2021, WSRW a rappelé à Global Diligence que « la conclusion de l'avis Corell se trouve au 25e paragraphe » et a mis en garde contre la présentation de passages analytiques comme conclusion. Global Diligence a répliqué qu'elle maintenait sa « compréhension de l'intégralité de l'avis de Hans Corell ». 

L'avis de 2002 a bien moins de poids que les dix arrêts de la CJUE. En effet, dans son arrêt rendu dans les affaires jointes C-789/19 et C-799/19 (paragraphes 137-138), la CJUE a explicitement nié toute possibilité pour la Commission européenne de se fonder à nouveau sur l'avis. Avis juridique de l’ONU de 2002 confirmant le raisonnement du Tribunal de l’UE selon lequel « la lettre du 29 janvier 2002 du Conseiller juridique des Nations Unies [...] ne constitue pas une source de droit de l’UE susceptible d’être invoquée devant le juge de l’UE, étant donné qu’elle ne s’apparente, en tant que telle, ni à une règle de droit international conventionnel contraignant pour l’Union Européenne ni à une règle de droit international coutumier. » Global Diligence ne tient pas compte de cette hiérarchie.

Elle ne reconnaît pas non plus que la CJUE a explicitement discrédité l'utilisation abusive de l'avis Corell par l'UE. L'auteur lui-même, Hans Corell, a qualifié ces distorsions d'« absurdes » et a vivement réagi lorsque des entreprises privées ont invoqué son avis pour justifier leurs opérations. « Signer un accord dans lequel le Maroc désigne le Sahara Occidental comme les “provinces du sud du Royaume du Maroc” est d'ores et déjà contraire à la responsabilité sociale des entreprises et aux principes de protection, de respect et de réparation », a déclaré Corell. Une telle pratique reflète précisément celle des partenaires de Global Diligence.

Suite aux arrêts de la CJUE de 2021, l'utilisation abusive de l'avis Corell aurait dû être considérée comme actée. Pour plus d'informations, voir les développements ci-dessous et dans les arrêts de la CJUE de 2021 relatifs au commerce et à la pêche.

4) Des principes généraux du droit international sont appliqués dans le mauvais contexte
Global Diligence applique sans réserve les principes généraux du droit international concernant les territoires non autonomes, comme si le Sahara Occidental était un cas type de décolonisation. Or, il n'en est rien. Depuis le retrait unilatéral de l'Espagne en 1975-1976, le Sahara Occidental est dépourvu de puissance administrante, un fait clairement souligné dans l'avis juridique de l'ONU cité par le cabinet. L'Espagne demeure la puissance administrante de jure, mais est absente du territoire et n'agit donc pas au nom du peuple sahraoui pour aller vers la décolonisation.

5) Global Diligence qualifie à tort le Maroc de puissance administrative
Global Diligence désigne le Maroc comme « puissance administrative ». Cette formulation comporte deux erreurs fondamentales : a) Dans la Charte des Nations Unies, le terme est « puissance administrante » et non « puissance administrative ». Le cabinet confond la notion de facto de contrôle administratif avec le concept juridique de « puissance administrante ». Ce dernier implique des obligations spécifiques en vertu de la Charte des Nations Unies, tandis que le premier n'a pas de signification juridique définie. Comme l'a rappelé l'avocat général de l'UE Wathelet dans son avis de 2018 dans l'affaire C-266/16 (§ 223) : « la notion de « puissance administrante de facto » n'existe pas en droit international ». b) Le Maroc ne détient aucun mandat juridique international sur le Sahara Occidental et n'est donc pas une puissance administrante. Cela est explicitement affirmé dans l'avis Corell (§6-7), que Global Diligence omet. Le commentaire faisant le plus autorité sur l'absence de puissance administrante figure au §388 de l'arrêt commercial de la CJUE de 2021, qui explique que l'avis Corell a été rendu par analogie avec les puissances administrantes - un rôle que le Maroc ne possède pas. Le Maroc lui-même reconnaît qu'il n'est ni la puissance administrante ni la puissance occupante et qu'il ne rend pas compte à l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies comme une puissance administrante est tenue de le faire. L'auteur de l'avis Corell précise clairement que son opinion est formulée par analogie.

6) Global Diligence ignore les critères et obligations liés à l'occupation
Global Diligence commence sa présentation en suggérant que les entreprises devraient traiter le Sahara Occidental comme un territoire « occupé », mais tire des conclusions fondées sur des considérations politiques plutôt que juridiques : « Pour les entreprises souhaitant opérer, il est plus sûr de considérer le Sahara Occidental comme un territoire occupé, où l'autodétermination sera finalement réglée en interne avec le Maroc. » La présentation omet d'examiner les obligations ou les limites d'une puissance occupante en vertu du droit international humanitaire (DIH). Elle se contente de revenir à l'avis par analogie de l'ONU, mal appliqué, sur les territoires non autonomes, ignorant l'absence de puissance coloniale. Par conséquent, elle n'évalue pas la manière dont les entreprises devraient agir dans un territoire occupé, ni ne traite de la condition de légalité de la conduite des entreprises dans un territoire non autonome dépourvu d'autorité administrante. 

7) Introduction à l'autodétermination « interne »
Le Sahara Occidental constitue une question de décolonisation au sens de la résolution 1514 (XV) de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies du 14 décembre 1960, intitulée « Déclaration sur l'octroi de l'indépendance aux pays et aux peuples coloniaux ». Cette résolution, souvent qualifiée de Magna Carta des peuples coloniaux, consacre le droit à l'autodétermination et à l'indépendance. Par conséquent, le peuple sahraoui a droit à l'exercice de l'autodétermination externe, y compris la création d'un État indépendant, libre de toute domination étrangère et de toute occupation militaire. En revanche, la notion d'autodétermination « interne » ne trouve aucun fondement dans l'avis juridique des Nations Unies ni dans les décisions des tribunaux internationaux concernant le Sahara Occidental. Les tribunaux internationaux ont confirmé que le Sahara Occidental et le Maroc sont des territoires « séparés et distincts », divisés par une frontière internationale.

Global Diligence appliquerait-elle la même logique d'autodétermination « interne » aux territoires annexés par la Russie ? Global Diligence conseille également aux entreprises de prendre en compte un hypothétique statut futur du Sahara Occidental (« …à traiter en interne avec le Maroc ») dans le cadre de leur diligence raisonnable renforcée. Il s'agit d'une attente très inhabituelle à imposer aux entreprises.

8) Survalorisation du soutien politique au Maroc 
Le cabinet met en avant des exemples de soutien politique international au Maroc comme s'ils étaient pertinents pour les obligations des entreprises en matière de droits humains. Si les soutiens politiques, comme le tweet de Donald Trump en 2020, peuvent illustrer des dynamiques géopolitiques, ils n'ont aucune incidence sur les responsabilités juridiques des entreprises en vertu du DIH ou du droit relatif aux droits humains. Au contraire, lorsqu'un gouvernement Occidental soutient politiquement une situation illégale, les entreprises de ce même pays ont le devoir encore plus grand de se conformer au droit et à la jurisprudence internationaux.

9) Lecture erronée du Front Polisario
Global Diligence présente à tort le Front Polisario comme ne recherchant qu'une indépendance totale.

Ce cadre juridique permet au peuple sahraoui de déterminer son propre avenir ; l’indépendance est une option parmi d’autres. La position constante du Polisario est son opposition à toute solution imposée qui nie ce droit au libre choix. En revanche, la seule proposition du Maroc – l’intégration du Sahara Occidental au Maroc – prive les Sahraouis de la possibilité de voter sur des options alternatives.

10) Minimisation du rôle du Polisario
Le Polisario est reconnu par l’ONU comme le représentant du peuple sahraoui et l’une des deux parties au processus de paix mené par l’ONU. En tant que mouvement de libération nationale, il est la seule entité de ce type à avoir adhéré aux Conventions de Genève, soulignant ainsi le caractère international du conflit entre les deux parties. La CJUE conclut que le Polisario représente légalement le peuple sahraoui et a accès aux tribunaux de l’UE pour défendre son droit à l’autodétermination. Pourtant, Global Diligence confond le Polisario avec « d’autres groupes sahraouis [...] soutenant l’administration marocaine ».

11) Mentions mensongères concernant les avantages pour le peuple sahraoui
La plupart des Sahraouis, en particulier les communautés côtières de la région de Dakhla, vivent dans des camps de réfugiés suite à l’invasion injustifiée et illégale du Maroc. La CJUE a statué que si les accords commerciaux UE-Maroc prévoient une quelconque exploitation, les avantages doivent revenir en priorité à ces camps de réfugiés. Paradoxalement, Global Diligence refuse tout dialogue avec le Polisario, qualifiant ce dialogue d’« inutile » pour évaluer les avantages. Cette position complique l’alignement des opérations sur les décisions de la CJUE.

12) Allégations trompeuses concernant l’engagement des parties prenantes
Global Diligence affirme que ses consultations ont inclus le Polisario et les organisations de la société civile qui le soutiennent. WSRW a demandé à Engie de publier l’étude de Global Diligence en 2023, mais n’a reçu aucune réponse. Il semble peu plausible que le Polisario ait participé à une telle consultation des parties prenantes. Cela fait écho aux affirmations similaires de la Commission Européenne concernant des consultations inclusives pour les accords commerciaux UE-Maroc au Sahara Occidental, qui se sont avérées mensongères par la suite. Voir le rapport de WSRW sur la fausse consultation des parties prenantes de l'UE dans notre rapport « Au-dessus des lois » (2020). WSRW, fort de son vaste réseau sahraoui, n'a connaissance d'aucune participation de groupe sahraoui à l'étude Engie de Global Diligence de 2021 ni à des cabinets de conseil similaires. Lorsque WSRW a demandé au cabinet de définir la notion de « partie prenante », de divulguer ses termes de référence et de préciser si les résultats seraient partagés avec le peuple sahraoui, Global Diligence n'a pas répondu.

13) Légitimité du « gouvernement régional » et des élections marocaines
Global Diligence affirme avoir consulté des « responsables élus et nommés » du soi-disant « gouvernement régional ». Le cabinet n'explique pas pourquoi il considère que les élections et les nominations organisées par le Maroc dans le territoire occupé sont juridiquement valides ou pertinentes.

Plutôt que de reconnaître le Polisario comme représentant le peuple sahraoui (comme l'ont affirmé la CJUE et l'Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies), Global Diligence traite les responsables soutenus par le Maroc à Dakhla comme tels. Cette situation est controversée. WSRW n'a pas vu Global Diligence affirmer que les députés russes à Sébastopol ou les députés élus lors des élections parlementaires israéliennes dans les territoires palestiniens occupés sont les représentants du peuple du territoire occupé.

14) Cadrage pro-marocain du conflit
Le rapport présente le plan marocain d’absorption du Sahara Occidental – le soi-disant « plan d’autonomie » – comme une tentative de bonne foi de trouver une solution, tout en décrivant la position sahraouie comme une simple « résistance armée intermittente », se produisant « malgré ces efforts ». Ce cadrage inverse la logique du droit international. Global Diligence qualifierait-elle d’autres occupations illégales et injustifiées dans des termes similaires, minimisant l’agression et diabolisant la résistance ? Le conflit prendrait fin immédiatement si le Maroc cessait son occupation et permettait au peuple sahraoui d’exercer librement son autodétermination, conformément à la Charte des Nations Unies.

15) Présentation de l’absence d’espace civil comme pacifique
Global Diligence décrit le Sahara Occidental comme « très pacifique ». Cela contredit directement le rapport annuel du Secrétaire général de l’ONU au Conseil de sécurité, qui documente les violations des droits humains. Qualifier le territoire de « pacifique » est un affront aux Sahraouis vivant sous occupation dans un pays que Freedom House classe parmi les plus bas au monde en matière de droits politiques et de libertés civiles. Le Haut-Commissaire des Nations Unies aux droits de l'homme et le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies ont tous deux récemment noté que le Haut Commissariat aux Droits de l’Homme (HCDH) n'a pas été autorisé à se rendre au Sahara Occidental depuis 2015.

Suggérer que Dakhla dispose de véritables institutions démocratiques où les Sahraouis peuvent élire librement des représentants est, pour le moins, profondément erroné. Le secrétaire général de l'association de surveillance du pillage des ressources naturelles est actuellement incarcéré dans une prison marocaine, condamné à perpétuité.

Engie, seul client connu de Global Diligence au Sahara Occidental, présente systématiquement ses opérations comme si elles étaient situées « au Maroc ». Ce cadrage est évident dans les rapports externes d'Engie, ses publications sur les réseaux sociaux et ses contrats avec des tiers connus. L'entreprise a refusé à plusieurs reprises de répondre aux questions de WSRW, notamment sur l'étude non publiée préparée par Global Diligence.

Rien n'indique qu'Engie ait jamais contacté un seul Sahraoui. Son étude environnementale affirme systématiquement que le lieu du projet est au « Maroc » et souligne même une augmentation de la population autour de la zone comme signe de réussite. Le projet lui-même a été explicitement promu par le gouvernement marocain dans les forums internationaux sur le climat comme preuve de ses investissements « verts » – une façon d'utiliser les énergies renouvelables pour masquer l'occupation du Sahara Occidental.

 « Ils ont sollicité notre assistance dès les premières étapes du projet afin de pouvoir se conformer à leurs obligations en matière de droits humains », a déclaré Global Diligence à propos de sa participation.

WSRW a du mal à associer l'engagement affiché d'Engie envers ses obligations en matière de droits humains avec son refus de reconnaître le statut internationalement reconnu – voire l'existence – du territoire sur lequel elle opère.

Plusieurs éléments problématiques de l'interprétation du droit international par Global Diligence et de son interprétation de l'avis juridique de l'ONU de 2002 ont été abordés par WSRW dans un courrier à l'entreprise en 2021. La plupart des questions sont restées sans réponse. 

L'existence même de l'étude de Global Diligence a été utilisée par Engie pour légitimer ses opérations sur le territoire. De ce fait, cette étude est devenue l'un des documents les plus problématiques actuellement invoqués pour défendre les intérêts marocains au Sahara Occidental. Quel que soit le contenu des conseils non publiés de Global Diligence à Engie, le résultat est clair : Engie s'appuie sur cette étude pour justifier des activités qui favorisent la politique de colonisation du Maroc - facilitant le transfert de citoyens marocains vers le territoire occupé, tout en évitant obstinément de reconnaître que le projet se situe au Sahara Occidental, sans le consentement du peuple sahraoui. Cela souligne pourquoi les avocats et les conseillers juridiques sont également tenus de respecter les Principes directeurs des Nations Unies relatifs aux entreprises et aux droits de l'homme : ils ne sont pas seulement les défenseurs de leurs clients, mais aussi les gardiens de l'intégrité territoriale, chargés de garantir que la conduite des entreprises est conforme au droit international des droits de l'homme et au droit humanitaire. 

« Il est difficile de comprendre comment un cabinet qui prétend fournir des conseils juridiques et des orientations sur la diligence raisonnable renforcée en matière de droits humains peut simultanément adopter une position aussi ouvertement politique et appliquer le droit international de manière aussi sélective dans le cas du Sahara Occidental. Dans ce contexte, WSRW recommande de ne prêter aucune attention aux avis de Global Diligence en matière de droit international ou de diligence raisonnable renforcée, ni aux arguments avancés par les entreprises qui dépendent de son activité sur le territoire », a déclaré WSRW.

Cette tendance reflète une tendance plus large et profondément inquiétante. Comme l'a souligné Wayne Jordash lors du même séminaire en ligne, l'occupation est par définition temporaire. Pourtant, au Sahara Occidental, tant la puissance occupante que l'entreprise qui a engagé Global Diligence refusent de reconnaître le statut du territoire comme étant occupé et non autonome.

WSRW sait qu'Engie a indiqué à ses investisseurs qu'elle tenait WSRW informé de ses projets au Sahara Occidental. C'est faux. L'intégralité de la communication avec Engie est disponible sur notre site web.

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TRANSCRIPTION ANNOTÉE (En anglais)
[Minute 25:30 to 41:00 are of Richard Rogers, Global Diligence]

[00:24:57]
(presenter) Let’s now turn to Richard who will discuss his work in Western Sahara, including the complexities surrounding the unresolved status of the region and the approach that companies should take to ensure compliance with human rights norms. 

[00:25:12]
(GD) [...] I am the founding partner of Global Diligence, which is a legal advisory firm. We specialise in international criminal law and international human rights and as part of that we offer assistance to businesses who are seeking to operate in these complex zones including Western Sahara. So I'll be talking about some of the key challenges for businesses who are interested in operating in Western Sahara 

[00:26:00] 
(GD) I have worked on three projects now. Each one has raised its own unique issue. And with quite different forms of assessments. But one thing has been consistent. And that is the political sensitivity and the legal complexity of the environment.

[00:26:30]
(GD) The businesses I work with have been involved with industries such as renewable energy, desalination, agriculture. And they sought our assistance at the early stages of the project so they could comply with their human rights obligations. 
(WSRW comment) The “stakeholder consultation” started in 2021, over two years after Engie and its partner - a company owned by the Moroccan king - had won a tender for the project in the occupied territory. 

[00:26:53] 
(GD) Now, what I’d like to focus on today is the broader question relating to the human right of self-determination. That is key to this type of context. It helps us answer the essential question of whether businesses are even allowed to operate in Western Sahara at all in any capacity however beneficial it might be.

[00:27:16] 
(GD) The other human rights are important and need to be dealt with on a more granular level, but the place to start is an assessment of self-determination. And that requires us to understand the legal status. 

[00:27:40]
(GD) In the case of Western Sahara this is where it gets really tricky. It has an unresolved status. It's not even clear whether we are talking about an occupied territory or not. That depends on who you ask. If you ask Morocco, United States, Israel, it's not occupied. If you ask Algeria, South Africa, and many other countries, it is occupied. And it's a changing landscape as many of these situations are.
(WSRW comment) The current status of Western Sahara is clear. The territory is defined as non-self-governing, documented by international courts and the UN. Whether an occupation exists is not a political question but a question of facts, i.e. exercise of effective control outside of internationally recognized borders. 
The status of occupied is also addressed by inter alia :

• UNGA resolution 34/37 
• the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights
• The 2018 EU AG Wathelet Opinion in case 266/16 (paras. 234-250)
• The legal service of the German Bundestag

As is the case with the other rulings and opinions issued of international courts, Global Diligence makes no mention of this. 

[00:28:08] 
(GD) But I think for businesses it is best to work on the assumption that they will be operating in an occupied territory. 

[00:28:17]
(GD) In terms of, sort of, the more factual or legal context, Morocco administers 75 percent of the territory. 
(WSRW comment) For the rest of the presentation there is not much more “legal context”. 
There is, for instance, no discussion surrounding the legal status of Morocco’s presence in the territory. The only specific reference is the mention of the UN 2002 Legal Opinion, which, we will see, is incorrectly referred to. 

[00:28:25]
(GD) It claims that it owns the whole territory and refers to that as the “Southern Provinces”. It has an autonomy plan that it issued in 2007 which allows the populations of Western Sahara to enjoy self-determination through making the region this semi-autonomous area but ultimately under Moroccan sovereignty. 

[00:28:50]
(GD) So according to the autonomy plan, and I quote, “the Sahara populations will themselves run their affairs democratically through legislative, executive and judicial bodies enjoying exclusive powers.” But ultimately Morocco would deal with defence and foreign affairs etc.

[00:29:13]
(GD) But despite these efforts to find a solution, there has been armed resistance on and off since the 1970s, led by the Polisario Front and supported by Algeria and indirectly Russia. 
(WSRW comment) Notice that there is no critique or problematic comment or distancing to the autonomy plan throughout, stating, uncritically that the “plan […] allows […] the populations [...] to enjoy self-determination making the region….”. 
The positive spin of Morocco’s “efforts” is presented in opposition to the negative portrayal of Polisario’s stance “despite these efforts”. Polisario is, in fact, the only of the two parties that has a position in line with international courts and signed peace agreements, and while Morocco is the one that caused the conflict through a continued, illegal, unjustified occupation, in violation of the 1975 ICJ Advisory Opinion. 
Notice that Global Diligence’s only reference to efforts of “solution” in the above-mentioned, is Morocco’s plan to integrate Western Sahara into Morocco. There is no mention, for instance, to the signed peace accords on referendum on independence under the auspices of the UN, which Morocco backed out from, and which the UN has spent millions of dollars to implement.
In this context it is worth underlining: 
* The reference to Western Sahara as a “region” is in line with Morocco’s terminology, not with international courts. 
* It is not the “population” (or the “populations”) that has the right to self-determination. It is a territory’s people, which is fundamentally different, which have been mostly displaced as ruled in the 2024 CJEU rulings, whereas “the majority of the current population of Western Sahara is not part of the people holding the right to self-determination, namely the people of Western Sahara” (Joint cases C-789/19 and C-799/19, paras 127-128).
* The plan was not “issued” in 2007, but rather “aired”. Few seem to know the content. Its lack of clarity which was underlined by the UN Special Envoy to the UNSC in 2024.
* The absence of possibility in the autonomy plan to reject it in a genuine self-determination. 

[00:29:30]
(GD) The position of the Polisario Front is, in essence, that the territory is under illegal Moroccan occupation and that any business operations no matter how beneficial are illegal and immoral. 
(WSRW comment) Notice the absence of legal context - for example, no reference is made to the conclusions and rulings in CJEU, the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights on the occupation of the territory or the High Court of South Africa ruling on phosphate plunder in Western Sahara. 
It is not for Morocco or European companies to determine who should benefit or what constitutes a benefit. That right rests solely with the Saharawi people. It is also obfuscating to not explain that Polisario advocates for self-determination in its fullest form: that is more options than only “autonomy”. Global Diligence is presenting a narrative that portrays Morocco as the one “seeking a solution” and the Saharawis as being the difficult party. 

[00:29:44]
(GD) The situation on the ground now is very peaceful. But it is worth remembering that the Moroccan military built the second largest wall in the world, the bern (sic) wall, and they built that around the area they control. And they have a hundred thousand soldiers guarding that part of Western Sahara. So it's obviously not that peaceful. 
(WSRW comment) This is controversial, particularly given the complete absence of any reference to democratic deficit. 
Yes, there are soldiers along the berm. But security personnel are all over the occupied territory, ensuring a complete dark spot in terms of political freedoms. 
The Special procedures of the Human Rights council has not been allowed to visit the territory for a decade. Independent journalists, researchers, lawyers, and Members of Parliament of the European Union are rarely allowed to access the territory if they wish to meet with Saharawis. 

[00:30:10] 
(GD) The Polisario Front, and I think it's fair to say an ever decreasing number of states, claim that only full independence from Morocco will satisfy self-determination of the people there. Other Saharawi groups are much more supportive of Morocco’s administration and their autonomy plan and the UN itself doesn’t add complete clarity. It officially considers Western Sahara to be a non-self-governing territory where the process of self-determination remains to be completed, but on the other hand, the UN Security Council has issued over 30 resolutions on Western Sahara and the last time it mentioned the word “occupation” was 45 years ago. 
(WSRW comment) The UN clearly addresses Polisario as the representative of the Saharawi people. The CJEU finds Polisario to represent the Saharawi people legally. Global Diligence here conflates Polisario with “other Saharawi groups”. Would Global Diligence juxtapose pro-Russian groups in Crimea with the government of Kyiv? 

[00:31:05] 
(GD) In fact, the more recent UN Security Council resolutions have spoken much more about Morocco’s autonomy plan and seem to find that very credible. So to add into this already complex mix, in December 2020 the US and Israel recognise Morocco’s full sovereignty over Western Sahara. 
(WSRW comment) The Tweet of recognition from president Donald Trump in 2020 and the position of the Israeli government are both interesting, politically speaking, but in WSRW’s opinion it does not make the legal analysis of the companies more complex. 

[00:31:30]
(GD) To sum up, in practical terms, it is generally accepted that the idea of full independence is no longer seen as viable by the UN, by Morocco, by most European nations, by the United States and by others. Internal self-determination in line with Morocco’s autonomy plan is considered to be the only serious and credible way forward at this stage. So where does that leave us in terms of self-determination and business operations? Well, as we have seen, the law is very messy, but for businesses wanting to operate, it's safest to consider Western Sahara as an occupied territory where self-determination will ultimately be addressed internally with Morocco as the administrative power. 
(WSRW comment) The last sentence is fascinating and full of contradictions. 
The first part of that sentence concludes that enterprises should view the territory as under occupation. But notice that nothing in Global Diligence’s presentation addresses IHL or Morocco’s illegal presence in the territory in violation of IHL. Or its lack of sovereignty/mandate as concluded by CJEU.
The second part of the sentence “...where self-determination will ultimately…” suggests that 
companies should today relate to the territory as a function of a hypothetical, possibly enforced political position for the future. 
WSRW finds it unhelpful to expect corporations to base today’s human rights compliance in view of how a status “will ultimately be” politically in the future. 
But the confusion does not stop there: the companies are asked to address Morocco as “administrative power”. What is that? “Administrative power” is not the same as the legal role/mandate as “administering power” over a non-self-governing territory under the UN Charter. Administering powers of non-self-governing territories have clear international legal status and obligations under international law. 
Adding the term “administrative power” into the mix is unfortunate in a lecture that seeks to provide legal clarity. 
A last twist for this hypothetical future scenario is that Global Diligence suggests that companies need to relate to the possibility that there is a case of “internal” self-determination. Considering that both the UN and the international courts rule that the non-self-governing territory is separate and distinct from its colonial powers in general, and that Western Sahara is separate and distinct from the neighboring country of Morocco, the concept of “internal” self-determination is meaningless. 
Internal self-determination - a concept often invoked in relation to indigenous peoples - is not how international courts or the United Nations have addressed the matter. The Saharawi people are not an indigenous people in Morocco, seeking more administrative control over ancestral lands - they have the right to self-determination and independence in relation to Western Sahara, which is their national territory in accordance with the law of decolonization. 
Lastly, one can wonder how Global Diligence is reflecting around the relationship about the current and future legal status in the above, to the “test” that Global Diligence will apply below. The “test” does not at all relate to the situation as occupied, as Global Diligence says companies should address it as. Nor does the “test” relate to the “internal” self-determination. Nor does the “test” consider Morocco being “administrative” or “administering” power. So the “test” below does not match the framework that Global Diligence has just laid out. 

[00:32:20] 
(GD) That does not mean that businesses cannot lawfully operate there, despite what the Polisario Front will tell you. It does mean that businesses should act with extra caution and sensitivity and help ensure that they do not contribute to human rights violations of the local people. 
(WSRW comment) “Lawfully”, according to whom? Which country’s legislation? Moroccan domestic law? The only place where Global Diligence is seen to expand on Morocco’s legal standing in the territory, is where it suggests Western Sahara is occupied, meaning, Morocco is occupier. Apart from that, Global Diligence does not expand on the legal framework a company should operate under in an occupied territory where the occupying power rejects being an occupying power. Everything in the rest of the lecture - including the alleged ‘test’ - fails to apply that framework. 

[00:32:40] 
(GD) So what does this extra caution look like in practice and how should businesses approach this issue from the start? Well, thankfully, we do have some guidance on this. In 2002, the UN’s most senior lawyer, Hans Corell, was asked to clarify the conditions for lawful resource exploitation in Western Sahara. So the very issue that many businesses are interested in. And in his legal opinion, he laid out a test, which I think is widely accepted as a standard to be applied in such situations. And, he basically stated that in non-self-governing territories, resource exploitation conducted for the benefit of the peoples of those territories, and on their behalf or in consultation with their representatives, is compatible with the UN Charter and the obligations of the administering power. 

(WSRW comment) Global Diligence’s reading of the Corell Opinion is misleading. The statement by Global Diligence reflects the eternal misrepresentation of the Corell Opinion, which has been thoroughly rebutted by the EU Court of Justice. The EU Commission and Council used the same arguments that are used here by Global Diligence: as long as the exploitation is to the benefit of the people, and there is a consultation, it is allegedly compatible with international law.

A) Global Diligence does not refer to the conclusion of the UN legal opinion (§25), but in practice refers to the content of §24, out of context. 

B) By applying the expressions “In such situations” and “in non-self-governing territories…” Global Diligence is misrepresenting the UN document. The Opinion clearly lays out the general obligations for administering powers over its colonies. However, and this is important, the opinion underlines that Morocco is not the administering power. 

The case is unique, and the legal text is made by analogy. By addressing the opinion as one of many cases internationally of similar situation, Global Diligence fails to take into account a fundamental part of the opinion. In fact, Western Sahara is the only non-self-governing territory in the world, the only case internationally - where a colony has no functioning administering power. 

The CJEU (§388, 2021 ruling on trade) underlines this aspect of analogy in the UN Legal Opinion. Corell later underlined in a lecture what this means for Morocco in Western Sahara. “Any limitation of the powers of such an entity acting in good faith, would certainly apply a fortiori to an entity that did not qualify as an administering power but de facto administered the territory”, Corell later clarified.

C) A couple of other important remarks by the CJEU are left out by Global Diligence:

* As concluded by the EU Court of Justice, the Corell Opinion concludes that the exploration or exploitation would be in violation of international law if not undertaken in accordance with the wishes and the interests of the people of Western Sahara. It does not express how those interests and wishes are to be considered (e.g. through a consultation). (§312 and §387, 2021 ruling on trade)
* The UN Legal Opinion is not the most authoritative source on the right to self-determination in Western Sahara. As noted by the CJEU, the UN Legal Opinion is not equivalent to advisory opinions delivered in accordance with Article 96 of that charter by the ICJ, the principal judicial body of the United Nations under Article 92 of that charter, which determine the law applicable to the question at hand (the Court here refers to the ICJ ruling on Chagos). (§386, 2021 ruling on trade)
* Even if Corell was applicable, the EU’s approach would still be in violation to international law, as it must not only be consistent with the interests of the people, “but also with their will”. (§389, 2021 ruling on trade).
In its ruling in joint cases C-789/19 and C-799/19 (paras. 137-138), the CJEU explicitly denied the very possibility of the European Commission to rely ever again on the 2002 UN legal opinion by ruling that “the letter of 29 January 2002 from the United Nations Legal Counsel [...] does not constitute a source of EU law which can be relied on before the EU judicature, given that it is not akin, as such, either to a rule of international treaty law which is binding on the European Union or to a rule of customary international law.”,

[00:33:45] 
(GD) So this is a safe test to apply for any operations even if it doesn't involve resource exploitation. So when designing for this broad issue, we basically need to determine: is the operation beneficial to the Saharawi people concerned with the project; is it being done in consultation with or in partnership with their representatives. 
(WSRW comment) As explained by the EU Court of Justice, it is not a safe test (see above). 
In addition, how can benefits to the Saharawis be established, in the current context? As stated by the EU Court of Justice: “a majority of the population of Western Sahara is not part of the people holding the right to self-determination, namely the people of Western Sahara. That people, which for the most part has been displaced, is the sole holder of the right to self-determination with regard to the territory of Western Sahara. The right to self-determination belongs to that people, and not to the population of that territory in general, of which - according to the estimates provided by the Commission at the hearing before the Court of Justice - only 25% is of Sahrawi origin.” (§128, 2024 ruling on trade).
It also establishes that “there is a difference in that regard between the concept of the ‘population’ of a non-self-governing territory and of the ‘people’ of that territory. The latter refers to a political unit which holds the right to self-determination, whereas the concept of ‘population’ refers to the inhabitants of a territory.” (§129, 2024 ruling on trade).
Notice how Global Diligence started out the lecture by stating it needed to analyse the Saharawi right to self-determination - which is a collective right for the entire people. Now, Global Diligence has massively reduced the concept to the “Saharawi people concerned with the project”.
As to the point of “consultation with or in partnership with their representatives”, it is worth noticing that consultation cannot be regarded as equivalent to the right to consent, as per the right to self-determination.

[00:34:15]
(GD) So let’s have a look at how we applied that test in practice.

[00:34:22]
(GD) So, first, it was important to understand the context, and this involved studying a whole range of documents from Morocco's autonomy plan: prior reports relating to the specific projects, court rulings relating to Western Sahara and their applicability to private businesses, recent human rights reports…

(WSRW comment) The autonomy plan doesn’t really exist as such to “study”. It is more of an idea. The absence of a real autonomy plan was commented on by the UN Special Envoy to Western Sahara, Staffan de Mistura, to the UN Security Council in October 2024. 
Notice that Global Diligence in its lecture not once refers to the rulings of international courts, but makes five references to Morocco’s political plan to include the territory into Morocco, and each time in a positive context. 

[00:34:42]
(GD) And it was also important to undertake stakeholder engagement: with UN bodies there, with Moroccan ministries, with the Polisario Front or the civil society organizations who support them… And, of course, and most importantly: with the representatives of the people themselves.
(WSRW comment) Two things. First, the way this is presented, tends to conclude that Global Diligence means that Polisario Front is not representing the Saharawi people, but that the people have other representatives. 
Second, and this is spectacular, Global Diligence namedrops Polisario Front in a public speech as an instition that has taken part in a stakeholder engagement. Why would Polisario have wanted to take part in such an engagement? WSRW struggles to believe that this is true. To what WSRW has managed to establish, Polisario has not been part of the stakeholder engagement. 
Global Diligence does the same by stating that un-named civil society organisations have taken part. It resembles the process that the EU commission undertook, when it claimed to have been undertaking stakeholder engagement, while in fact it hadn’t. For the EU’s stakeholder engagement, we refer to our WSRW report “Above the Law” (2020). 
WSRW has never heard of a civil society organisation advocating for self-determination being part of Global Diligence stakeholder analysis undertaken on behalf of clients who work in partnership with the Moroccan government.
It can be added that in 2025, WSRW learnt that investors were informed by Engie that it has briefed WSRW about its progress in the territory. This is misleading. Engie fails to answer hardly any question it has been asked, nor responded at all to our latest letter. See the complete WSRW-Engie correspondence here. 

[00:35:04]
(GD) Choosing the representatives was not straightforward either. It’s an extremely sensitive question; there are very strong views about who represents the Sahwari (sic) people — who represents them generally? Who represents them in the region of the operation? Of course, Morocco claims to represent all residents, but that is legally and politically contested, and it’s the same with the Polisario Front. And we confirm through interaction and desk research that the maximalist position of the Polisario Front remained unchanged and unhelpful to the benefit analysis.
(WSRW comment) Notice how Global Diligence here juxtaposes the claims of Morocco with Polisario in terms of the solidity of its legal and political claims. 
It is correct that Morocco’s legal claims are legally contested - being rejected in 1975 by ICJ, then by numerous UN resolutions, as well as by CJEU from 2016-2024, by African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights in 2022. Polisario’s representativity, on the other hand, has never been legally contested, except by the EU Commission during the 2012-2024 the CJEU proceedings - a claim that was rejected by the Court. As such, juxtaposing the two entities’ legal recognition is misleading. 
The “maximalist position” - a referendum on self-determination where independence is one of the options on the table - is the only solution that so far has been accepted by both parties to the conflict. 
This argumentation - that Polisario’s political position is “unhelpful” for a benefit analysis - is identical to how the EU Commission argues in its Staff Working Document in 2018. This line of argument is not in line with the one of the CJEU.

[00:35:47]
(GD) And there were real questions about whether the Polisario front was acting in good faith, given that they prefer absolutely no investment whatsoever - even if it benefits the Saharawi people. So, what became clear was that there is no single representative person or body for all the Saharawi people, so we decided to undertake a more nuanced assessment of the real stakeholders relating to the given project. So… who were the communities actually affected by the projects?

(WSRW comment) Would Global Diligence claim that the Kyiv government fails to act in “good faith” when it comes to Russian investments in Crimea even if it benefits Ukrainians on the peninsula?
The claim that “there is no single representative person or body for all the Saharawi people” makes sense if one ignores the UN resolutions referring to Polisario as the representative of the Saharawi people, and the CJEU rulings that clearly states that Polisario has legal standing to represent the Saharawi people in EU Courts. 
Notice how Global Diligence here introduces the word “communities”. Global Diligence is here again replacing the collective right to self-determination over such projects with the rights of those who happen to be affected very locally. 
The criticism that Frente Polisario is “unhelpful” or “not acting in good faith” because it rejects investments raises a troubling question: is Global Diligence suggesting that people are not allowed to say no to projects on their own land? Even if others claim those projects would be “beneficial,” does that strip the people of the right to withhold consent? The right to refuse is fundamental to self-determination. If the recognized representative body of the Saharawi people opposes a deal, dismissing its stance by declaring there is “no single representative” is not a neutral observation - it is a way of invalidating their voice altogether.

[00:36:28]
(GD) Where did they live, how were they represented, etc.? And, for example, in the southern area of Dakhla, which is home to many Sahwari (sic) people, the region has a political system that is fundamentally democratic. The regional government is comprised both of elected and appointed officials, and for the projects operating in that region, in Dakhla, we felt satisfied that these actors, the vast majority of them being Sahwari (sic), were the representatives of the people for the purposes of the benefit analysis.
(WSRW comment) It is called “Saharawi”, not “Sahwari”.
According to the CJEU (§128, 2024 ruling on trade), some 75% of the population in the territory today are from Morocco, and only 25% are from Western Sahara, whereas most of the Saharawis have fled. WSRW believes the proportion is way lower than 25% in Dakhla. Most Saharawis in the occupied territory live today in the capital city of El Aaiún, and very few in Dakhla, where they are a highly marginalised community. 
There is a leap in argument. Global Diligence started the lecture by defining the territory as under occupation. However, by now, it seems that Global Diligence recognises Moroccan elections outside of Morocco’s internationally recognised borders. This leap is not explained. Western Sahara scores among the lowest in the world on political freedoms. 
As long as the UN and international courts clarify that Polisario represents the Saharawi people, it is unclear how Global Diligence, from a legal perspective, came to a “feeling” of satisfaction that they found some other institution in Moroccan government institutions. 

[00:37:14]
(GD) We met those representatives in Dakhla: we discussed the projects, we discussed any concerns. We met people like regional directors of agriculture, presidents of the regions, MPs, or Sahwari (sic) people. And in all three projects the representatives were supportive of the investments and, depending on the project, they stressed issues such as the desperate need for affordable fresh water in the region. They pointed out that the conditions were perfect for agriculture if they had fresh water for irrigation.
(WSRW comment) This is the first indication that Global Diligence travelled into the occupied territory. Who gave them the permission? Did Global Diligence obtain consent from the people of the territory prior to undertaking it, or was it only done in dialogue with the Moroccan government? 
With “presidents of the regions”, WSRW expects this most likely refers to the “president of the regional councils”. An occupying power has no right to divide the occupied territory into administrative units treating it as anything other than separate from its own country. This is part of the IHL analysis that the Global Diligence presentation does not address. 
It is interesting that Global Diligence was allowed to travel to the territory. The OHCHR has not been granted access to the territory since 2015 despite its repeated requests for a visit in line with Security Council resolutions, most recently resolution 2756 (2024). The UN Secretary General has urged that the lack of independent, impartial, comprehensive and sustained human rights monitoring remains a major obstacle to comprehensively assessing the situation. International observers, including parliamentarians, researchers, journalists and lawyers, reportedly continue to face entry restrictions, with dozens denied entry or expelled during the reporting period. 
The UN Secretary General denounced in his report of 2024 - and whilst deploring the shrinking civic space - that his office received reports of exploitation of natural resources in Western Sahara without meaningful consultations and participation by affected communities. Reports described investments as frequently prioritizing interests that do not address the needs of the local Sahrawis, exacerbating economic disparity and hindering equitable development for all Sahrawis. 
In 2025, the UN Secretary General repeated his concerns to the UN General Assembly, noting that on 20 March, United Nations special procedure mandate holders sent a communication to Morocco, expressing concerns over alleged violations affecting 79 Sahrawi activists. In the communication, they also referred to alleged human rights violations linked to coastal development projects that entail large-scale land acquisition, destruction of private property and displacement.

[00:37:58]
(GD) They expressed how important it was to create new jobs in the region, particularly for young people, and to diversify away from commercial fishing, which is the main industry. They talked about how the youth were now well trained in agriculture and business, but didn't have enough jobs. They talked about how clean energy would be important, not just to run the project itself, but to feed into other areas: providing energy for Dakhla. They hoped that this type of investment would lead to social improvements.
(WSRW comment) An effect of the Engie project that Global Diligence has aided, is, according to documents that WSRW obtained, to secure people to move to Dakhla. https://wsrw.org/en/news/engie-consistent-in-ignoring-international-law 

[00:38:40]
(GD) They hoped that the refugees would eventually come back and participate in this life and reap some of the benefits from this investment. So basically, certainly, in relation to the projects that that we assessed, we found that, for the Sahwaris (sic) currently in the region, there were clear benefits that were likely to enhance their self-determination: enhance them to freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development. For the returning Sahwaris (sic), their right to return was unaffected by the particular projects that we looked at.
(WSRW comment) Here, there is a leap in argumentation. 
It is not explained how aiding Engie with a project that will move, perhaps, thousands of Moroccan farmers into the territory, will aid the Saharawis obtaining self-determination (“likely to enhance their self-determination”). The only way this makes sense is that the right to self-determination is interpreted in a different way than what it normally means in terms of that right in the context of a people of a non-self-governing territory. 

[00:39:23]
(GD) And they too were likely to benefit, if and when they did come back. And, for the Sahwaris (sic) living east of the bern (sic) line, the project had no bearing on their self-determination. And, of course, we made a whole number of recommendations to each of the companies to help ensure that the situation was properly monitored, and that the company could adapt to any changes. And, of course, as I discussed at the beginning, this was just an assessment of the bigger question of self-determination.
(WSRW comments) Global Diligence here views the return into the occupied territory as a precondition to benefit. This is in contradiction to the CJEU rulings. It should be added that Global Diligence finds the court rulings “apply to state-to-state relations pursuant to established principles of public international law, which is not directly binding on private entities.” It is interesting that Global Diligence is so unaligned with the interpretation of the court.

[00:40:01]
(GD) And, on top of that, the businesses needed to carry out much more granular assessments of the other human rights issues, whether they be labor, health, environment, freedom of association, etc.

[00:40:15]
(GD) Yes, so, just to wrap up, I think that Western Sahara is a very good example that demonstrates the complexities of operating in regions of unresolved status, where the legal ambiguity, the political sensitivities, and the human rights risks all collide together.
(WSRW comment) There is not much legal ambiguity today in terms of the status of the territory. There are two sets of legal frameworks that can be applied, the one of IHL for the part that is under foreign occupation - and the one on non-self-governing territories, where the people have right to self-determination and independence. 
The Global Diligence presentation does not analyse the first, and only selectively addresses the second. 
Regarding the formulation “good example”: There are no other cases internationally with a non-self-governing territory, without an administering power assuming its role, partially occupied by another country, and where international courts underline the rights of the people to self-determination in line with the UN Charter. 

[00:40:41]
(GD) The region definitely needs investment and, if it's done right, it can provide a real benefit to the local people. Thank you very much.
(WSRW comment) Western Sahara is not a “region” according to the international courts. That is Moroccan terminology. Western Sahara is a non-self-governing “territory”. Global Diligence does not refer to Ukraine as a “region”.

[00:40:50]
(Presenter) Wonderful. Thank you so much, Richard. Some really interesting points that came out there, and interesting to hear more about your work in Western Sahara. We now have 20 or 18 minutes until the end of this webinar, which we are dedicating to Q&A so that we can answer any of those more complex, tricky questions.

[00:41:11]
(Presenter) That maybe we can do live rather than through writing, so I do encourage everyone to put their questions into the Q&A section at the bottom of the chat. But to kick us off, maybe we can just talk about how businesses can negotiate these complexities in terms of, also, commissioning some of these assessments. When is the right time for them to start engaging maybe experts or external organizations outside to start assessing some of these risks that both Wayne, you, and Richard have been speaking about during your panel? Wayne, maybe I'll turn to you first and then Richard.

[00:42:02]
(Wayne Jordash) When is the right time? You know, let me answer that by saying or talking about heightened due diligence. As I indicated during my presentation we are talking about four essential steps.

[00:42:18]
(Wayne Jordash) The first step is assessment of the conflict, or, in this instance, the occupation, or purported occupation. Step two is the assessment of the impact, or likely impact, of business activities on the conflict. Third step is identifying the business impact on human rights — that's through a human rights risk assessment. And step four, which is, of course, the most important bit, which is acting to meet the responsibilities which have been clarified during the first three steps.

[00:42:54]
(Wayne Jordash) That’s planning, implementing, and evaluating the business activities accordingly. And so, you are talking about a pretty complicated process. A full spectrum, heightened, due diligence process calls upon the business to really look at the dynamics of the occupation, which, of course, can be changing and evolving, and to take further steps to try to understand effectively how those activities, how those products that the businesses produce, how the use of resources by the business impacts the dynamics of the conflict or any human rights violations that are occurring.

[00:43:49]
(Wayne Jordash) So, you know, these are extremely complicated inquiries, and require, in many instances, deep investigations. And, so, simple answer: the sooner you get going, the sooner you get to bottom out some of these complex answers. And, you know, there are some due diligence which can be conducted perhaps without calling in third party experts, but I doubt very much whether a business can conduct these assessments themselves relying upon their internal resources.

[00:44:31]
(Wayne Jordash) And so, the sooner the right experts are hired, the better. And that, of course, should be before any business activities; that's just logical. And, most importantly, it should be a periodical process. Once conducted, that is not the end of it, because, as I made the point and as Richard has clarified, the situation evolves. And so, what happens today…

[00:45:03]
(Wayne Jordash) I mean, Israel in the occupied Palestinian territories is a very good example. You know, what was happening pre-October 7th is quite different to what is happening October 7th, or at least has the potential to be significantly different. So, it's as soon as possible and as often as is necessary.

[00:45:23]
(Presenter) Very interesting. I'll turn to you, Richard, quickly for your reflections, and then we've got a question in the chat.

[00:45:31]
(GD) Yeah, I don't have much to add. I think there's certainly nothing wrong with doing this type of assessment up front. But, in the cases that we worked on, the businesses had already been in the planning stage for years beforehand but had not started operating, so they hadn't,..certainly committed any human rights violations. But they had undertaken these massive projects. And they had undertaken commercial assessments, they had done environmental impact assessments, they had spent a lot of time meeting the various partners and planning the operation.

[00:46:12]
(GD) And, I guess it was at that stage where they felt that they were ready to go ahead, that they brought in the outside experts to say: okay give us a give us a plan for this for the complexities of the human rights issues that we face. um and that's a that's a perfectly reasonable way to do it, I think. So, as long as you get that assessment before you start to build, then that's absolutely fine. And there can be quite a lead time before that happens for the big projects.
(WSRW comment) WSRW believes that a heightened due diligence study should be done earlier, for instance prior to even starting planning, even prior to signing the agreement, for instance to ascertain whether one has signed with the government of the right country. The time that Global Diligence came in to undertake studies for Engie, the latter had already an agreement with the government of Morocco, which has no sovereignty or international mandate to be present in the territory. The “stakeholder consultation” started in 2021, over two years after Engie and its partner - a company owned by the Moroccan king - had won a tender for the project. 

[00:46:45]
(Presenter) Great. Thank you very much. And, um, Wayne, I'll turn to you first about with this question due to its focus on Israel: for a corporate sustainability professional working in a multinational company with operations in Israel subsidiary sales, etc., what are some ways to raise awareness to question or challenge business activities in an illegal occupier? What would be some tips for middle management in a company that is profit driven? Thank you 

[00:47:18]
(Wayne Jordash) Raise awareness to whom?

[00:47:21]
(Presenter) Yeah, so I think what this question is driving at is: how do you get that internal buy-in in a business that is profit driven, that is operating in this sort of situation in Israel? What are some ways to raise awareness internally, or question or challenge the business activities that are at the core of a business?

[00:47:45]
(Presenter) And particularly with middle management, those that are trying to drive change, perhaps, in the business… I think we've seen a number of examples in our own work where this has been the challenge in terms of getting the internal buy-in to conduct this sort of assessment prior to, perhaps, some more kind of formal pressure coming from externals.

[00:48:05]
(Wayne Jordash) So, yeah, well, it's certainly, as you say, Lara, a feature of our work, which is, you know, middle management or sustainability teams, showing huge enthusiasm for heightened due diligence and for ensuring that the business activities are responsible. And then, after the initial enthusiasm, a roadblock occurs, which is that the executive board or the top management suddenly get shy about those activities. There's no simple solution, of course. Every company is different. Every company has a different culture. Every company has different relationships between middle management and above. But, you know, from an advisory perspective, what we try to do is make the law less scary, make it more understandable. You know, many occupations may well involve violations, but many occupations may not amount to annexations. And so, there is room to maneuver in terms of business activities, in terms of labor, relationships with the occupied people, in terms of what we've been discussing: the best interests of the population.

[00:49:46]
(Wayne Jordash) And so, you know, there can be no blanket assumption that working in an occupation involves human rights violations. However, of course, the more the violations stack up, the more it begins to look like an annexation, the more it looks like systemic or systematic violations, the more that it becomes more difficult for businesses to operate.

[00:50:14]
(Wayne Jordash) So, I think the starting point, certainly from companies like ours and beyond, is to try to explain these things as simply as possible, and not overcomplicate issues by dressing things up in legal language. I hope I didn't do that! What I was trying to do was really sort of try to explain to businesses that there is a way through this. It requires work, it requires explanation, it requires clarification, but there is a way through this.

[00:50:44]
(Wayne Jordash) And a way to do business in many occupations in a responsible way. And so, um, I think, to me, I mean, that's as good as I can explain, which is how we try to persuade executive boards and top management that their best interests lie in doing this analysis and making sure that they put themselves in the best position to maneuver through what may be worrying violations, but are not made less worrying because they're ignored.

[00:51:18]
(Presenter) Yeah, and to whoever… it was an anonymous question, but to whoever wrote that question, if you would like any case studies of why proactive rather than reactive assessments are better, we can provide them to you, so if you ever need the kind of reasoning that you can sell internally, we do have some good examples of that. I wonder whether maybe, Richard, I can pose this other question to you in the interest of time, just so that we can try and answer as many as possible, unless you have um any other comments on that question which feel free to add.

[00:51:50]
(Presenter) But, how important do you think robust internal whistleblowing arrangements are for a business to monitor compliance with, and identify breaches of HRL and other laws during operations in occupied territories?

[00:52:05]
(GD) Well, I mean, so, first of all, you would hope that it wouldn't be necessary to have whistleblowers exposing the abuses of a business if the business had had a proper human rights assessment and proper advice and had followed that advice. And they had their policies in place, they had their monitoring in place, etc., etc…

[00:52:28]
(GD) But I think that whistleblowers do have a place, um, in certain contexts, in certain businesses, because it can be very difficult for people from the outside to understand what's going on on the inside. If you're in a very complex environment… let's choose another one: Eastern Congo. At the moment, where there are business operations going on from Western companies, it's very difficult to know what they're actually doing, because it's a very dangerous and high-risk area to go.

[00:53:06]
(Richard Rogers) So, there’s very little monitoring. So that I think whistleblowers do have a place in certain contexts and can be very valuable. But, again, you would hope that responsible companies would not be worried about that, because they would have to be abiding by the human rights rules.

00:53:33
(Presenter) Thank you. In terms of the next question, something that's been posed in the chat and I'll put this one to you Wayne: considering a similar approach to the one that Richard has taken in Western Sahara, how do you think the businesses should operate on the Palestinian territory?

00:53:55
(Presenter) This person says: "I'm used to interpreting the law as imposing to cease every kind of operation in the OTP, as businesses usually disrespect the Palestinian population exploiting their labor and resources at cheap prices while fueling the Israeli economy -- and thus its crimes. But do you think some activities would benefit the Palestinian population?" 

[00:54:19]
(Wayne Jordash) It's a very good question actually, and one that, I think, you know, only the Palestinian people can answer. In a sense, what I would say is this: the international rulings on the Israeli occupation of Palestinian land are very clear. There's not the kind of nuance that there may be in Western Sahara, which Richard addressed. The law is fairly clear and corroborated by a variety of sources and not just the International Court of Justice, which I referred to: Special rapporteurs, UN, academics, and so on. 

[00:55:01]
(Wayne Jordash) So, the law really clarifies that Israel has annexed through settlements in the OPT, and that annexation rests upon a variety of violations of international humanitarian law, such as the forcible transfer of population, transfer of Israeli population into the occupied territories, the taking of resources which belong to the Palestinian people, violation of the right to self-determination, violation of the discrimination [sic], and so on and so forth.

[00:55:52]
(Wayne Jordash) So, let me put it this way: the room for businesses to maneuver in the occupied territories in light of these findings is very, very narrow. I wouldn't sit here and say that it's impossible to operate in the occupied territories, and particularly in the settlements, without violating one or more of these international rules… but it's very difficult. And I think the question does come down to why I think it's a great question: it comes down to, essentially, consent of the Palestinian people, which is why I can't answer that, you know. 

[00:56:33]
(Wayne Jordash) So, you'd have to focus into the business activity, focus in/on where it is happening, focus into specifically what it does, and focus into whether the Palestinian population in that locality consent to and benefit from those business activities. It's a sliding spectre, of course, you know. And as I say, without a doubt, the room for maneuver of businesses is extremely narrow.

[00:56:56]
(Presenter) Brilliant, thank you. And with my eye on the clock I just want to give Richard the opportunity to answer this question: “Are there legal mechanisms available to seize the assets or profits of businesses operating in occupied territories where such profits result from unjust enrichment”

[00:57:14]
(Richard Rogers) Yeah, there's all sorts of potential legal action that can be taken. There's criminal action, using anti-money laundering laws and others. There's human rights sanctions regimes, there are all sorts of both criminal and civil actions and quasi-legal actions like sanctions.

[00:57:35]
(Richard Rogers) But of course, [for] those you have to persuade a significant country or region, like the EU, or the UK, or the US to impose those sanctions. For the criminal and civil actions you have to persuade prosecutors to go forward; for the civil actions you have to persuade judges to find your favour. There are actions, there are potential actions of course.

[00:58:01]
(Presenter) Wonderful, thank you. Well, I think that that's where we'll end the session for today. Thank you to both of our speakers for such a rich discussion and to everybody who joined our third session in our series on business operations in conflict-affected and high-risk areas.

[00:58:18]
(Presenter) We've covered a lot of ground, and we will circulate a few key takeaways and the recording after this session. I hope it has been helpful in giving you some practical insights and tools to help your businesses or organizations navigate these issues, and thank you again for being with us today. Thank you!

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