A draft resolution circulated by the US administration on 26 October would make Morocco's autonomy plan the sole basis for further negotiations, while framing autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty as the most feasible solution. If adopted, the text would risk turning a UN process intended to enable self-determination into one that presupposes the outcome.

The draft retains references to self-determination and a mutually acceptable solution. But these words ring hollow if the Saharawi people are not free to determine their territory's future. The text risks setting a dangerous precedent by narrowing the political choices in advance and placing the UN process within a framework that favours Moroccan sovereignty.

The US draft resolution (download here) also praises President Donald Trump's leadership. An earlier “zero draft” was leaked last week. Several amendments have since been made, but they do not resolve the fundamental problems. Find here a good analysis of the specific differences between the two texts (in Spanish).

This week’s resolution is about more than Western Sahara. It is about whether occupations will be accepted by the United Nations. The resolution “seeks to set a dangerous precedent that threatens the very foundation of the post-World War II international legal system”, US professor Stephen Zunes told CounterPunch yesterday.

Here are six key concerns with the latest text, presented yesterday: 
 

1. Self-determination is preserved as a word, but lacks a free decision-making process

The text mentions self-determination and a mutually acceptable solution. These are significant formulations, which provide a basis for demanding genuine Saharawi consent.

But there is an inherent contradiction: How can the people freely determine the territory’s future if negotiations may only take place within a model that presupposes Moroccan sovereignty?

In 1975, the International Court of Justice found that the historical ties it examined did not override self-determination through the free and genuine expression of the will of the territory’s people. What is decisive is therefore the people’s free choice.

Autonomy can in principle be a freely chosen outcome. The problem arises if it is made the only accepted option in advance. The draft describes no clear procedure ensuring that the Sahrawis can accept or reject the proposed status.

2. The autonomy plan becomes the only permitted basis for negotiation

The most far-reaching element is in operative paragraphs 5 and 7: Morocco’s autonomy plan is to be the only basis for further negotiations.

This is stronger than describing the plan as a possible or preferred starting point (which was the case in the 2025 resolution). The wording attempts to close the discussion on alternative solutions.

At the same time, paragraph 8 describes autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty as the most feasible solution. The two formulations work together:

• The basis for negotiation is narrowed to Morocco’s proposal.
• The desired outcome is stated as autonomy under Morocco.

The political effect would be to shift the negotiations from the question of Western Sahara’s status to the question of the terms of Moroccan control.

The text does not expressly recognise Moroccan sovereignty as an already existing legal fact. But it attempts to make that sovereignty the final framework of the negotiations.

3. The referendum is removed from the mission’s name

Paragraph 1 would extend the mission’s mandate to 31 October 2027, but at the same time rename it from MINURSO to MINUSO from 1 November 2026. This removes the reference to the referendum from the name.

It is a very clear political marker. The mission’s name is a reminder that its original task included a referendum. Removing this element signals that the UN is to orient itself toward a different function.

4. The mission is extended, but downsizing is put on the agenda

Paragraph 2 asks the Secretary-General to present proposals by 30 January 2027 on, among other things:

• Reducing the authorised uniformed personnel.
• Closing or merging observation sites.
• The future structure, resources and support for the political process.

This is therefore not an immediate wind-down. But downsizing is written directly into the request to the Secretary-General.

Paragraph 3 then announces a decision on the mission’s future, including a reshaping of the mandate.

The combination is unfortunate: the UN’s presence may be weakened while the negotiating space is narrowed. Fewer observers and fewer bases may reduce the possibilities for independent presence and monitoring. How serious this becomes depends on the concrete proposals.

5. Consultations with the Sahrawis are an opening, with clear limitations

Paragraph 6 requires consultations with a broad range of Sahrawis in the territory, the refugee camps and the diaspora, including outside the negotiating parties.

The text secures neither free participation, protection against reprisals, nor a decisive role for the outcome of the consultations. Nor is there any guarantee that those consulted can themselves define the political alternatives.

The provision can therefore be used for genuine inclusion, but also to give an already fixed process a veneer of popular support.

Being heard is not the same as being allowed to decide.

6. The US gets a dual role, while human rights are missing

The text praises President Trump (!) and gives the US a prominent role as facilitator. At the same time, Morocco’s proposal is elevated to the only basis for negotiation. This raises a serious question about the balance of the process: The facilitator role is coupled to a text that in advance favours one party’s model.

Furthermore, the text as shown contains no express mandate for independent human rights monitoring in the territory and the refugee camps. Consultations with Sahrawis cannot replace systematic monitoring, access and reporting.

What should UN Member States demand?

States should demand that the wording on the autonomy plan as the only basis be removed, and that the text ensure a credible process for the Sahrawi people’s free decision. States should also oppose a hollowing-out of the mission and work for an express human rights mandate.

The Security Council’s responsibility for peace does not give it free rein to set aside the UN’s fundamental principles. Article 24(2) of the UN Charter requires the Council to act in accordance with the Organization’s purposes and principles, including self-determination.

The strongest problem with the draft is therefore that it risks preserving self-determination in wording while removing the free decision from the process. The UN thereby risks becoming a tool for legitimising a pre-selected outcome.